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          CHAPTER ONE 
     
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
 
           Background  
 
In the year 2012, over 60 per cent of all credit active consumers in South Africa had 
been defined as over-indebted.1 By the year 2014, official estimates were that up to 40 
per cent of the South African workforce’s income was being spent on repaying debt.2 
Today, debt continues to flourish.3 The National Credit Monitor has found that only 
48 per cent of the 24 million credit active consumers in South Africa were up to date 
with their credit repayments in the first quarter of 2017.4 In the year 2018, credit bureau 
TransUnion CEO, Lee Naik, highlighted that almost 73 per cent of personal income in 
South Africa goes towards the servicing of debt.5 When one evaluates the fast-paced, 
consumption driven society that we live in, it is not surprising that most people are 
living well above their means. Peer pressure is a major reason for this drive for material 
assets, while marketing strategies of advertisers have become more intensified and far-
reaching.6 Subsequently, the greater the pressure there is to purchase mobile phones 
or other technological devices, the easier it is for advertisers to target the public 
                                                 
1 Milford Bateman ‘South Africa’s post-apartheid microcredit-driven calamity’ Law, Democracy and 
Development Vol 18 (2014) 119. 
2 Malcolm Rees & Dane Volker ‘”Garnishees ‘exploit all South Africans” - Webber Wentzel’ Money 
Web 15 August 2013, available at http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-financial/garnishees-
exploit-all-south-africans--webber-went, accessed on 10 April 2018. 
3 Carin Smith ‘First-time credit defaults highest since December – index’ Fin24 9 April 2018, 
available at https://www.fin24.com/Economy/first-time-credit-defaults-highest-since-december-index-
20180409, accessed on 10 April 2018. 
4 ‘South Africans are big borrowers and poor savers – expert’ Fin 24 5 March 2018, available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Money/Home/south-africans-are-big-borrowers-and-poor-savers-expert-
20180305-2, accessed on 10 April 2018. 
5 ‘High court ruling unleashes flood of new credit applications’ Fin24 10 April 2018, available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/high-court-ruling-could-unleash-flood-of-new-credit-applications-
20180410, accessed on 10 April 2018. 
6 Deborah James ‘Money-Go-Round: Personal Economies of Wealth, Aspiration and Indebtedness’ 
(2012) 82 Africa 20 at 30. 
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through such technology.7 Furthermore, there is a feeling of dignity and convenience 
in obtaining a loan rather than being unable to purchase household necessaries or attain 
emergency relief.8 However, a correlative to the competition raised by peer pressure 
is the secrecy and stigma attached to indebtedness.9 The same pride that one gets when 
being able to purchase items on credit is quickly turned into shame when one realizes 
that he or she is ‘in over their heads’ and unable to afford to make repayments.10 This 
may ultimately result in borrowers remaining silent when finding themselves over-
indebted, and then spiraling into even more so-called ‘debt traps’ in order to keep up 
with payments.  
It is often assumed that it is the salaried people in middle income brackets that 
find themselves in debt.11 This is because formal sector credit providers are reluctant 
to expose themselves to the risk of debtors not paying and are thus only willing to lend 
to those with a regular income.12 However, this dissertation will be taking a deeper 
look into the world of consumer debt in South Africa, focusing on the low-income 
segment of the population and the associated formal, but smaller-scaled ways of 
lending. A ‘low-income’ consumer will refer to a person that earns a relatively low 
salary (‘low-income households’ are described as those in Living Standard Measures 
1-313)14 who is or would be denied access to mainstream or formal credit on this 
basis.15 ‘Formal credit providers’ will refer to those commercial banks that are 
governed by the law and credit regulation in South Africa. It will also refer to 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) that are likewise governed by the law and credit 
regulation but that principally focus on smaller loans. ‘Informal credit providers’ will 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 T. Wilson et al. ‘Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer Credit Transactions’ (2009) J 
Consumer Policy 32:117–140 at 125. 
9 James op cit note 6 at 31. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid at 35. 
12 Ibid. 
13 ‘Living standard measures’ South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), available at 
http://www.saarf.co.za/lsm/lsms.asp, accessed on 17 November 2018. 
14 Polly Mashigo ‘The lending practices of township micro-lenders and their impact on the low-
income households in South Africa: A case study for Mamelodi township’ (2012) New Contree, No. 
65 at 24. 
15 Wilson et al. op cit note 8 at 118. 
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refer to members of the public that disburse smaller loans while not under the 
governance of the law or credit regulation, namely ‘mashonisas’16 or ‘loan sharks.’17  
With the abovementioned high rate of indebtedness in South Africa, it is easy 
to assume that credit is relatively accessible in this country. However, this has not 
proved to be the case for the low-income segment of the population. Low-income 
earners find credit highly inaccessible due to collateral constraints, lack of credit 
history, high interest rates and the complexity of contractual information.18 These low-
income households only require small amounts of money to run their day-to-day 
expenses, yet commercial banks see this as a risky and unprofitable loan.19 Informal 
sources of credit, on the other hand, respond to these concerns by allowing the 
borrowing of small amounts at any time and for any reason, as well as holding the 
advantage of being equipped with local community knowledge and trust.20 However, 
although informal microlenders appear to respond to these concerns, they often use 
exploitative practices on the already vulnerable.21 Ultimately though, it is these 
concerns which has led to formal microcredit being introduced to the world.  
The concept of microcredit, commonly described as an industry where low-
income earners are given access to loans, originally began as an economic and social 
experiment in developing countries.22 By virtue of such, microcredit came to be 
introduced in South Africa: an unequal but growing economy where people sought to 
escape the bounds of poverty. Formal microcredit23 was therefore introduced in South 
                                                 
16 Mashigo op cit note 14 at 25 describes ‘Mashonisa’ as an African term for informal sources of 
credit who provide such credit to households that have been traditionally marginalized by the formal 
sector. This is done within their own communities, using their own systems and methods without legal 
external assistance. 
17 The Cambridge Dictionary Online (available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org) defines a loan 
shark as a person who charges very large amounts of money for lending unsecured loans to someone 
at illegally high interest rates, often forcing repayment through blackmail or threats of violence. A 
mashonisa is a form of a loan shark. 
18 Mashigo op cit note 14 at 25. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid at 30. 
21 Ibid at 25. 
22 Megan Whittaker ‘South Africa's National Credit Act: A Possible Model for the Proper Role of 
Interest Rate Ceilings for Microfinance’ (2008) 28 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 561. 
23 Formal microcredit refers to microloans that are administered by legally compliant and regulated 
microfinance institutions. See further explanation on page 3, paragraph 2 of this dissertation. 
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Africa as a development initiative,24 involving the distribution of small-scale loans to 
low-income consumers who lack access to banking and related financial services.25  
Understanding the categorical description of a microloan under South Africa’s 
primary credit legislation, the National Credit Act26 (NCA), is less clear. In general, a 
microloan is regularly considered a ‘short term credit transaction’ under the NCA.27 
According to reg 39(2)(a) of the National Credit Regulations,28 a short-term credit 
transaction means a ‘credit transaction in respect of a deferred amount at inception of 
the agreement not exceeding R8 000, and in terms of which the whole amount is 
repayable within a period not exceeding 6 months.’ Such definition tends to fit 
squarely with the features of microcredit. However, for the average layperson, a first 
glance at the ‘short term credit transaction’ definition in the regulations does not lead 
to the immediate assumption that such is synonymous with micro credit. Furthermore, 
if one were in fact to have such knowledge and were to proceed to reading to reg 39(3), 
the definition of an ‘unsecured credit transaction’ could also lend to the assumption 
that microcredit falls within this category.29 This uncertainty and lack of clarity within 
the regulations is problematic due to the fact that the category in which microcredit 
falls is of significance when evaluating the maximum prescribed interest rates and 
charges. Therefore, to provide an exact definition and position of microcredit within 
the bounds of the NCA proves difficult. This argument will be analysed in further 
detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Bateman op cit note 1 at 92-93. 
25 P. Meagher & B. Wilkinson 'Filling the Gap in South Africa's Small and Micro Credit Market: An 
Analysis of Major Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Issues' IRIS Discussion Paper No.02/11 (2002) 12-
19. 
26 Act 34 of 2005. 
27 Jonathan Campbell ‘Short-term credit: Recent developments and the new limits on the cost of micro 
–loans’ (2016) SA Merc LJ 462. 
28 GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006. 
29 The definition states that “an ‘unsecured credit transaction’ means a credit transaction in respect of 
which the debt is not supported by any pledge or other right in property or suretyship or any other 
form of personal security.” 
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Contemporary issues with Regard to Microcredit  
 
The emergence of the microlending industry is said to be one of the greatest 
achievements in ensuring that communities have access to financial resources.30 
However, the reality has been that microcredit has now morphed, in contemporary 
times, into another technique of transferring finance from the poorest individuals and 
communities at the bottom class of society into the hands of the financial elites at the 
top.31 One of the main problems is the fact that almost all microcredit is supplied to 
employed individuals to meet basic consumption needs, and not to those that require 
such credit to start new businesses as an income generating project, as was the original 
microcredit model’s intention.32 However, the consumption needs are regarded as a 
necessity by these low-income earners, who often out of desperation proceed to sign 
contracts for credit without fully understanding them.33 Low-income consumers may 
not have finished school, with English not being a first language, ultimately creating a 
reaction of being overwhelmed by the length of contracts and the language used in 
them.34 These low-income consumers may also not have a network of family or friends 
to assist them in difficult financial times due to having low-incomes themselves.35 
Furthermore, there has been a mistaken belief that commercialised MFIs would 
obediently stick to their declared mission and thus responsibly lend to consumers.36 It 
has however arisen that certain MFIs in South Africa have been deliberately targeting 
vulnerable and exploited individuals.37 This only increases South Africa’s position as 
one of the most unequal countries in the world. As one of South Africa’s financial 
analysts once stated: ‘[c]redit made available to households in South Africa is anything 
but developmental.’38 Many debtors are unable to afford to pay back loans at the end 
                                                 
30 David Porteous & Elizabeth Hazelhurst Banking on Change: Democratising Finance in South 
Africa, 1994-2004 and Beyond (2004) 77. 
31 Bateman op cit note 1 at 99-100. 
32 Meagher P ‘Microfinance regulation in South Africa: A comparative perspective’ Development 
Bulletin (2002) 57. 
33 Wilson et al. op cit note 8 at 125. 
34 Ibid at 123. 
35 Ibid at 125. 
36 Bateman op cit note 1 at 126. 
37 Ibid at 132. 
38 Melzer I ‘Banks exploit financial illiteracy of clients’ BD Live 3 December 2013, available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/12/03/banks-exploit-financial-illiteracy-of-clients, accessed on 
17 November 2018. 
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of the month, which results in repeated loans being taken out to finance the original 
loans, adding to the high costs of credit.39 The high price of small credit for low-
income consumers increases over-indebtedness and perpetuates poverty.40 This is 
particularly concerning as poverty alleviation is a government priority and low-income 
consumers are especially vulnerable to the economic conditions in South Africa.41 It 
is the poor who borrow small amounts of money and who pay the most for credit, and 
ultimately who have little voice in policy making to address these concerns.42 It is thus 
of paramount importance that low-income consumers are aware of their rights and 
know where to turn to for redress or assistance from competent governmental 
policies.43 
South Africa’s primary credit legislation, the NCA, is intended to be the source 
of protection for these low-income consumers. Although the NCA has been powerless 
with regards to informal money lending and associated informal credit agreements,44 
it does govern formal microcredit. Section 3 of the NCA sets out that the purposes of 
the Act are to ‘promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, 
effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers.’45 This 
effectively demands that not only should the low-income segment of the population 
have access to credit, but any credit handed out must be done so responsibly in order 
to prevent too readily available cash which can finance a consumption driven society. 
The NCA further created the National Credit Regulator (NCR) whose purpose is to 
‘promote and support the development, where the need exists, of a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market 
and industry to serve the needs of historically disadvantaged persons, low income 
persons and communities, and remote, isolated or low density populations and 
communities, in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act.’46 The NCR thus 
ensures that credit lending is responsible and made accessible. However, South 
                                                 
39 Jonathan Campbell ‘The Excessive Cost of Credit on Small Money Loans under the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 251 at 268. 
40 Campbell op cit note 27 at 472. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Campbell op cit note 39 at 262-263. 
43 Wilson et al. op cit note 8 at 130. 
44 James op cit note 6 at 28. Note that stokvels are expressly excluded from the NCA in s 8(2)(c). 
45 Section 3 of the NCA. 
46 Section 13(a) of the NCA. 
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Africa’s legislators still face significant challenges in ensuring that these primary aims 
of the NCA, relating to responsible and accessible credit, are balanced. It is essential 
that the regulatory framework governing the microcredit industry gives effect to this 
balance and does not militate against the NCA’s goals. Ultimately, this is a crucial 
factor in ensuring that the socio-economic experiences of South Africans are protected 
and advanced. The financial and social circumstances of members of society can be 
improved through equitable access to credit in financing businesses, education, and 
emergency healthcare. However, it can just as easily be destroyed with irresponsible 
access to credit.   
I shall consequently address the following matters in this dissertation: First, 
what the objectives are of the NCA relating to microcredit are, namely promoting 
accessible and responsible credit. Secondly, what shortcomings the NCA faces with 
regard to its microcredit regulations that attempt to give effect to such objectives. 
Lastly, by referring to a case study based on Bangladesh and its comparable 
experiences with the microcredit industry, I will identify what potential amendments 
could be made to the legislative framework.  
 
Objectives of the Research and Significance of the Study  
 
In this dissertation I shall highlight the shortcomings of the microcredit regulations in 
the NCA to develop proposals that ensure that the microfinance regulatory framework 
is not only made sensible on paper but in practice. Furthermore, it is hoped that these 
proposals will reflect a prosperous reality for South Africa’s socio-economic context, 
at present and in the future. Through analysing South Africa’s unique context, and 
drawing on experiences of the microcredit industry in Bangladesh (a similar 
developing country), I shall contribute to South Africa’s policy framework in making 
recommendations on amendments. These recommendations will support the objective 
of giving effect to the aims of the NCA relating to equally accessible and responsible 
credit and in ensuring that the social and economic welfare of South African citizens 
are advanced. 
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Research into this topic is essential for two reasons: The first reason is that it 
is a necessary contribution to the literature on microfinance in South Africa. Not only 
will this dissertation focus on highlighting all the main aspects of microcredit 
regulation in South Africa, but it will also tell a cohesive story from the introduction 
of microcredit regulation to present-day recommendations on the improvements of 
such. The second reason is that this dissertation will contribute to policy reform in 
South Africa, intended to be a feed for further research and action on creating 
amendments to the microcredit policy framework. In sum, this dissertation will have 
both theoretical and practical significance. 
 
   Research Questions  
 
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the first research question that I will be considering 
is what the objectives of the NCA regulations on microcredit are, namely those set out 
in s 3 of the NCA relating to accessible and responsible credit. This entails a 
grammatical interpretation, but also a value based, contextual and purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation which looks at the purpose for which and context in which 
microlending was introduced in South Africa, and how its role remains essential today 
in current socio-economic conditions. In Chapter 3, the second research question 
explores what the shortcomings of the NCA regulations on microcredit are, focusing 
on interest rates, service fees and initiation fees and how each rate or fee subsequently 
affects accessible and responsible access to microloans. Although these rates and fees 
are essential to the upkeep of the microcredit industry, they require vast re-evaluation 
to maintain a balance between the interests of both creditors and debtors. The 2016 
NCA regulations 39 to 48 have generally reduced the cost of credit in terms of interest 
rates, but the introduction of the initiation fee and service fees has increased the cost 
of credit, particularly for short-term credit transactions.47 In Chapter 4, the third 
research question looks at what lessons could be drawn from an analogous developing 
country with a similar socio-economic, political and historical background. This aspect 
                                                 
47  Campbell op cit note 27 at 462. 
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of the dissertation will be based on a comparative case study on Bangladesh, where 
the success and failures of the microcredit system in this country will be analysed. I 
have chosen Bangladesh due to its long history in the microcredit industry, its 
comparable socio-economic context and political past, and its genuine commitment to 
the success of microcredit in search of a developmental framework. Chapter 5 
introduces the fourth research question, which looks at what potential amendments 
could be made to the regulations on microcredit in South Africa in order to promote 
accessible and responsible credit. Chapter 4’s findings will be used here in considering 
what lessons and perspectives could be of use to the South African microcredit 
industry. These amendments will also take into account the analysed objectives of the 
NCA along with the identified shortcomings that require modification to realise such 
objectives. 
 
Methodology and Theory  
 
The methodology used in this dissertation shall be based on desktop research. This 
involves consideration of journal articles written by scholars in this field, as well as 
textbooks, online books, reports and web-based articles on views pertaining to the 
microfinance industry. There will also be a strong relation to the NCA, with an analysis 
of its microcredit regulations. Furthermore, legislation will also be used in the 
Bangladesh case study and in any general referrals to the South African legislative 
framework.  
Regarding Chapter 4, it is important to understand what case study research 
entails. It is a qualitative approach in which one investigates a bounded system over 
time through data collection involving multiple sources of information, ultimately 
reporting a case description or theme.48 Put more simply, comparative analysis 
involves comparing the law of one country to that of another country and then 
assessing how the two legal systems are similar or different.49 In a single instrumental 
                                                 
48John W. Creswell ‘Chapter 4: Five Qualitative Approaches to Inquiry’ Qualitative inquiry and 
research design: choosing among five approaches 3 ed (2013) 73. 
49 Edward J. Eberle ‘Comparative Law’ (2007) 13 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 93. 
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case study, the researcher is to focus on a single issue while subsequently selecting a 
bounded case (in this case, country) to represent this issue.50 It is noteworthy though 
that case studies acknowledge that there can be no generalisations from one case to 
another as the contexts of cases will differ.51 A case study method is therefore used in 
this dissertation to investigate the legislative microcredit policy space in Bangladesh 
that may be useful in comparing South Africa’s microcredit regulation.52  
With regards to the matter of context in this dissertation, there is often a 
distinction made between the law itself and the context in which laws are applied in 
practice. This is why it is of paramount importance to study the legal culture of a 
country to see what rules apply, how they function and how effective they are.53 There 
are underlying forces that operate within society to help form and influence the law 
and give it substance,54  and the law is therefore never set in a purely black letter or 
hard positivist space. Positivism is described as a separation between law and morals, 
in that legal rules exist as they are rather than what we think they should be.55 However, 
a positivist studies the morals of society when evaluating the law of a society, even 
though the approach will be more scientific than narrative.56 In contemporary times, 
there has come to be a new stream of positivism, namely soft legal positivism which 
accords due respect to the constrained role of moral considerations in adjudication.57 
It also, however, recognises the institutional constraints in society on legal rule-
making.58 As stated by legal positivist philosopher H.L.A. Hart, a conceptual analysis 
of the words is important to sharpen the awareness of the words.59 Furthermore, legal 
positivist philosopher Joseph Raz has admitted that ‘[W]e do not want to be slaves of 
words. Our aim is to understand society and its institutions.’60 Soft positivism therefore 
does create the conceptual space in which the law may be judged morally and 
politically, however, it is silent on the outcome of the question of political morality.61 
                                                 
50 Creswell op cit note 48 at 74. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Yin, R. K. Case study research: Design and method 3 ed (2003) 13. 
53 Eberle op cit note 49 at 95. 
54 Ibid at 97. 
55 Herbert Hovenkamp ‘Positivism in Law & (and) Economics’ (1990) 78 Cal. L. Rev. 815 at 818. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Brian Leiter ‘Positivism, Formalism, Realism’ (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1138 at 1139. 
58 Hovenkamp op cit note 55 at 820. 
59 Yin op cit note 52 at 14. 
60 Joseph Raz ‘Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law’ in The Authority of Law (1979). 
61 Leiter op cit note 57 at 1160. 
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On the other hand, legal realism refers to the awareness of the flaws and limitations of 
judges who sometimes make choices based on their own political and moral views.62 
Accordingly, the creation of law can also be influenced by these political and moral 
influences in society.  
In this dissertation, I therefore adopt a positivist, black letter approach to 
evaluating legislative regulations and their amending, while also adopting a law-in-
context, realist approach to understand the context in which these regulations govern. 
This may be considered soft positivism, but the appropriate method of inquiry is one 
that tests the law in action, makes a comparative analysis and acknowledges that 
commercial law should reflect commercial practice by considering the context in 
which it operates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Brian Z. Tamanaha ‘Understanding Legal Realism’ (2009) 87 Tex. L. Rev. 731 at 732. 
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  CHAPTER TWO  
 
     OBJECTIVES IN THE NCA AND THEIR MICROCREDIT CONTEXT 
 
Purpose of Act63  
3. The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and 
accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers, by-  
(a)  promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, and 
in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit under sustainable 
market conditions;  
(b)  ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit providers;  
(c)  promoting responsibility in the credit market by-  
(i)  encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and  
fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers; and  
(ii)  discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual  
default by consumers;  
(d)  promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers;  
(e)  addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and credit 
providers by-  
(i) providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights;  
(ii) providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in 
order to make informed choices; and  
(iii) providing consumers with protection from deception, and from unfair or 
fraudulent conduct by credit providers and credit bureaux;  
(f) improving consumer credit information and reporting and regulation of credit bureaux;  
(g)  addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing mechanisms 
for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of all 
responsible financial obligations;  
(h)  providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements; and 
(i)  providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement and 
judgment, which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer 
obligations under credit agreements.  
 
Statutory Interpretation 
The purpose of this chapter is to use statutory rules of interpretation to understand the 
objectives of the NCA in a more detailed light as well as assess the context in which 
these objectives, and their association with microcredit, came about. This is an 
important task if one seeks to successfully amend current regulations on microcredit 
                                                 
63 Section 3 of the NCA. 
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as one first apprehends what such amendments should look like in order to give effect 
to the objectives of the NCA. The task of interpreting legislative provisions is not an 
easy exercise, but interpretation is something that people subconsciously do on a daily 
basis, such as interpreting body language.64 We are constantly required to ‘read 
between the lines’ to understand the proper meaning of things.65 With regards to 
interpreting the wording of statutes, the meaning of a word is derived from the total 
structure of the language, including the context in which the language is used.66 
However, this contextual approach was not always the approach taken by the legal 
profession. Originally, an orthodox text-based approach was used by legal 
professionals to interpret statutes, which focused principally on the literal meaning of 
the legislation.67 The idea was that if the meaning of the text was clear, it was to be 
applied exactly as to the intention of the legislature.68 If the meaning of the text was 
unclear, or if a strict literal interpretation would result in ambiguity, then the court 
could use the so-called ‘golden rule’ to deviate from the literal meaning and attend to 
‘secondary aids’ of interpretation to determine the intention of the legislature.69 
‘Secondary aids’ include the headings of sections, the long title of the statute, and the 
text in another official language.70 Only where these secondary aids to interpretation 
were insufficient could one turn to ‘tertiary aids’ such as common law presumptions 
where context becomes relevant.71 This was a form of structuralism where the meaning 
of the language was deemed to be ascertained from the grammatical structure72 and 
the intention of the legislature was gathered from the literal meaning of the text.73  
On the other hand, the text-in-context approach to statutory interpretation 
states that ‘the purpose of the legislation is the prevailing factor in interpretation’ and 
that the political and social context must therefore be taken into account.74 This 
                                                 
64 Christo Botha Statutory Interpretation: An introduction for students 5 ed (2012) 83. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid at 85; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit No 
and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 21; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 17. 
67 G E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 28. Also see for example R Koster & Son Pty Ltd & 
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approach requires a purpose-orientated perspective which always recognizes context, 
not only in cases where a text-based approach has been unsuccessful.75 However, it is 
noteworthy that this approach still requires a balance between the grammatical and 
contextual meanings.76 An approach to statutory interpretation that completely ignores 
the text of the legislation is a threat to the separation of powers and the rule of law.77 
This is because an interpretation that completely ignores the text created by parliament 
threatens a situation arising where the judiciary is deemed to be overriding the 
intention of the legislature and disrespecting its powers. It may also be seen as counter-
majoritarian as the unelected judiciary appears to be overriding the elected 
legislature’s will. Accordingly, courts must respect the legislation that parliament 
enacts, ensuring that personal bias disguised as a contextual analysis does not have a 
prejudicial influence.78 Courts have thus been willing to use this wide interpretation 
power but have been conscious of its limits79 to avoid circumstances in which the 
legislature cannot predict how its laws will be interpreted.80  
This context-based approach has, however, been mandated by s 39(2) of the 
1996 Constitution,81 as well as by the Constitutional Court itself.82 Section 39(2) of 
the Constitution, the so-called ‘interpretation of statute clause,’ provides that ‘when 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights.’ This mandatory provision means that statutory interpretation therefore has 
to be conducted with the values of the Constitution in mind.83 Sections 36(1) and 39(1) 
of the Constitution refer to these values, relating to an open and democratic society 
based on freedom, equality and human dignity. It is noteworthy though that this 
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context-based approach in s 39(2) of the Constitution also does not envisage that the 
meanings for statutes bear no relation to their words.84 Extra-textual factors are still 
considered in preference to the legislative text.85 As stated by Ngcobo J in Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism:86 ‘The emerging 
trend in statutory construction is to have regard to the context in which the words 
occur, even where the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous.’87 
Furthermore, since the values underlying the Constitution are not absolute, interpreting 
statute is about balancing conflicting rights and values too.88 This balance of 
conflicting interests is thus required when interpreting the objectives in the NCA.89  
When considering the text of s 3 of the NCA which sets out the objectives of 
the NCA, the wording is quite clear and unambiguous. It seems that there are three 
main objectives set out. The first primary objective is to ‘promote and advance the 
social and economic welfare of South African citizens.’90 The second primary 
objective is to ‘promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, 
efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry.’91 The third primary 
objective is to protect consumers in a number of ways, as listed in the relevant 
subsections. Textually, these three objectives are separately listed, but contextually 
these three objectives are very much interlinked and lead to the same intention. 
Protecting consumers and promoting an accessible and responsible credit market both 
adds to the social and economic welfare of South Africans. Microcredit is understood 
to be a primary contributor to social and economic inclusion for South Africans, thus 
essentially being directed by these objectives. To completely understand this link 
though, the context in which microcredit was introduced and its contributing factors 
to social and economic inclusion must be analysed. It is here where we can begin to 
understand how microcredit has sought to comply with these objectives in the NCA 
by creating a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, 
effective and accessible credit market and industry. Importantly, microcredit also 
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seeks to protect consumers by promoting an accessible credit market ‘to all South 
Africans, and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit 
under sustainable market conditions.’92 Again, this leads to uplifting both the social 
and economic welfare of South Africans. Given that the rules of statutory 
interpretation require a contextual analysis, this chapter will continue to assess the 
context in which the microcredit industry was enacted and remains functional today. 
It is based on this context that we understand how microcredit gives effect to the 
objectives of the NCA. 
 
Contextual Analysis  
 
Background 
 
In the year 2012, South Africa was jointly ranked first in the ‘Doing Business’ World 
Bank Report in ‘getting credit’ i.e. highest access to credit.93 This is a testament to 
both South Africa’s great access to credit but also the consumption driven credit 
market that has left a debt-stressed population.94 A more accurate reality of South 
Africa’s economy, however, is that its Gini coefficient is amongst the highest in the 
world with great income disparity between the rich and poor.95 South Africa still faces 
a number of challenges today, mainly related to poverty, unemployment and income 
inequality.96 The country essentially has two economies that are vastly divided in terms 
of class, race and employment. The first economy is assumed to be a sophisticated, 
advanced economy based on skilled labour and secure employment.97 The second is 
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known as a marginalised, mainly informal, and unskilled economy populated by the 
unemployed or informally employed.98 Policies and programmes have therefore been 
introduced to try and bridge this inequality gap, one of them being the financial project 
of microlending.99 Microlending, as previously stated, is an industry that seeks to give 
low-income persons access to a range of financial services.100 These financial services 
are offered at the low end of the market by different categories of suppliers.101 There 
are seven categories of suppliers of microfinance services in South Africa: 
microenterprise lenders; salary-based microlenders; co-operative financial institutions 
such as commercial banks; alternative banks; affordable housing finance suppliers; 
and retailers.102 Furthermore, although access to financial services under microcredit 
immediately assumes merely access to credit, it is also about including access to 
savings and insurance, which are other forms of financial services that become more 
accessible once the credit market has opened up.  
With regard to the divide between the poor and wealthy, South Africa’s two 
economies are essentially based upon the South African financial services sector which 
includes both formal and informal providers.103 Formal financial service providers 
adhere to sanctioned laws and regulations, and examples of such include large 
banks.104 Although generally available in South Africa’s urban regions, formal 
services are often unsuited to the needs and circumstances of the poor who may find 
formalized banking incomprehensive and intimidating.105 This is somewhat 
attributable to South Africa’s legislative framework being detached from the 
circumstances of those whom it serves, but is also a result of the general assumptions 
about the country’s commercial banks.106 The informal financial services sector is 
large and can include anything from ‘stokvels’107 to burial societies and loans from 
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mashonisas within communities.108 This sector is defined by lack of adherence to any 
laws.109 Research shows though that a relationship with the formal or informal 
financial services is generally correlated to income.110 In South Africa, income is 
closely related to race, and race, although genetic, is also of influence in history and 
culture.111 These factors therefore all interlink and play a role in household decisions 
on whether the unregulated financial sector is more convenient and better understood 
or whether people are more trusting of the formal sector.112  
In the developing world, a large segment of the poor population lives beyond 
the scope of their nation’s legal system,113 living in the so-called ‘informal sector’ as 
expressed above. This is of particular concern, as it is believed that the law under the 
formal sector is one of the main mechanisms in controlling societal action and creating 
development.114 As a result of the realities of poverty, people living in the developing 
world find alternative means of participating in the commercial sector through 
informal, accessible and inexpensive forums.115 Although this alternative might seem 
to be a generally logical route to take, it in fact creates major implications for the 
economic framework of a country. Due to these alternatives used as informal ways of 
participation, the poor become more and more disconnected from the formal sector, 
eventually without any way of escaping from such. For instance, without original 
access to the formal sector, if someone were to eventually seek access to the formal 
sector through a loan of sorts, they would have difficulty in proving credit histories or 
establishing access to bank accounts.116 Because they remain marginalised in this way, 
there is little opportunity to escape poverty through credit loans, especially when 
accessing credit loans helps decrease exposure to unpredictable events like illness, 
food insecurity and death.117 A formal framework does, however, need to be readily 
accessible and appealing to the poor should they feel comfortable in participating and 
trusting such a framework to help them escape the realms of poverty. Therefore, 
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empowering the poor essentially requires meaningful changes to the legal 
framework.118 This is about empowering individuals to make decisions to use 
resources under their control, thereby shifting responsibility and countering systems 
that see the poor as incapable or undeserving of managing their own financial assets.119 
In this regard, the poor no longer need to reject capitalism as an enemy that has 
abandoned them, because capitalism is now working for them too in creating a safe 
space of participation.120 This again highlights the role of culture in the economy. 
Although cultural practices are seen to be ‘informal,’ culture carries extremely 
valuable elements of trust and comfortability which can be used as a tool to formalise 
practices. Ultimately, formalisation is said to be ‘a path to legal empowerment’ and 
legal empowerment helps people become economically productive in numerous 
ways.121 
On the other hand, to escape from the informal sector in South Africa is not 
simple. Apartheid still has long lasting effects that have created inhibiting 
circumstances which are difficult to change. For instance, during apartheid, the 
government increased the rent of government-provided housing, occupied by people 
of colour who had little access to employment, thus making it almost impossible for 
them to fulfil their debt commitments.122 This eventually led to widespread protest 
where renters either refused to pay the increase or stopped paying rent in boycott.123 
Therefore, as the rate of default increased, formal sector banks grew wary of lending 
in townships.124 Not only did this create a lack of trust and presence of banks operating 
in townships, but the poor, mostly black, segment of the population in return grew 
highly distrustful of formal financial institutions. When commercial banking services 
are seen as untrustworthy, intimidating and too costly, people tend to develop ‘self-
help’ institutions to access capital.125 In fact, some studies have found that small 
businesses in South Africa are often financed with personal savings or stokvels rather 
than commercial loans as people trust themselves or the community more than they 
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trust commercial banks.126 Peer pressure from the community is a major aspect of 
influence in rural communities,127 whereas this kind of personal relationship cannot be 
created with commercial banks. Lending, on the other hand, is also hindered by risk 
assessment, as it is based on credit histories which rule out many people, including 
micro entrepreneurs, because they lack documented credit histories or are too 
overwhelmed by the paperwork.128 Therefore, issues related to risk assessment, trust 
and perceived complexity of the paperwork involved create institutional barriers or 
social norms held against formal institutions, that may be difficult to overcome.129 
Provided that these disincentives to formalise remain, the poor will continue to prefer 
using personal savings and self-help institutions to finance their livelihood or to start 
up small businesses.  
 
Introduction of the Regulatory Framework  
 
Credit has played an important role in society for decades, and legislation governing 
usurious interest rates has thus existed from a very early stage.130 In South Africa, 
certain types of credit were regulated by different provincial legislation until the first 
usury statute was enacted in 1926.131 This Act was then drastically amended and 
named the Usury Act of 1968.132 The purpose of this Act was to place limitations and 
responsibilities on microlenders to protect consumers from usurious exploitation.133 
However, it ended up having the unintended consequence of excluding the low-income 
group of the South African population from access to credit.134 This legislation was 
also implemented during apartheid and therefore entailed the exclusion of the 
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country’s majority black population.135 However, the concept of microcredit was 
beginning to become known as an economic and social experiment in the developing 
world, often regarded as an ‘anti-poverty mechanism.’136 Possibly being influenced by 
such, the Minister of Trade and Industry signed the Usury Exemption Notice137 to the 
Usury Act into law on the 31 December 1992.138 This exemption allowed credit 
providers to charge unregulated interest on small loans so that credit providers could 
cover the full cost of the loan, making microlending institutions more attractive.139 
This resulted in the emergence of commercial microlending in South Africa and 
subsequently an improved rate of access to credit.140 On the other hand it also resulted 
in the exploitation of desperate and vulnerable borrowers, contributing significantly to 
their over-indebtedness.141 By the Minister’s signature, the microlending industry was 
now legitimized, making possible ‘limitless profit’ for lenders ‘unbounded by any 
finance charge at all.’142 The reality that apartheid was falling and that the ANC 
government would be left with a bitter legacy of a disorientated and failing economy 
meant that a radical and far-reaching programme, such as microfinance, was 
desperately needed.143 Although mashonisas had been around for a long time,144 there 
was now a formal credit industry that provided small-scale loans and spoke to the 
needs of a growing upward and increasingly mobile urban population that had been 
largely excluded from the mainstream banking sector.145 Thus, even though South 
Africa has a long history of community-based self-sustainable finance, the commercial 
microcredit model was seen as radically better.146  
Under the enthusiasm for microcredit, a number of international development 
microcredit programmes were established in South Africa such as the Get Ahead 
Foundation (GAF) and the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF).147 By the early 2000s, 
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the microcredit model had become the most high profile and well financed 
international developmental policy of all time.148 Former United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan had been quoted as stating that access to credit ‘helps alleviate 
poverty by generating income, creating jobs and allowing access to schools and 
healthcare’ which supported the interest in microcredit as a developmental tool.149 
Commercial banks that traditionally did not serve low-income earners and that were 
reluctant to enter the microcredit market due to the high costs involved were now also 
becoming interested in offering small loans.150 This exemption to the Usury Act did 
not last long though. In 1999 the Microfinance Regulatory Commission (MFRC) was 
established which, through a technical committee in 2002, identified several problems 
with the existing credit legislation.151 These were that it provided ineffective consumer 
protection for low-income groups; credit costs were still too high; and some credit 
providers were engaging in reckless behaviour.152 It soon became a concern that the 
introduction of microcredit was having little impact on poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion.153 Therefore, after careful consideration of this report, the Department of 
Trade and Industry drafted the ‘Consumer Credit Policy Framework’ which 
subsequently led to the drafting of the National Credit Bill.154 As a result of such, the 
South African Government passed the NCA which came into effect in 2007, officially 
repealing both the Usury Law of 1968 and the Usury Law Exemption of 1992.155  
According to the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mpahlwa, the 
original purpose of the NCA was to ‘promote a credit market that is fair, transparent, 
accessible and responsible. It also aims to promote a market that is competitive and 
sustainable… It specifically prohibits practices such as reckless lending and automatic 
increases in credit limits and regulates interest and fees.’156 Many formal credit 
providers objected to a number of provisions on the basis that they imposed costly and 
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burdensome obligations on credit providers.157 However, it was essential that checks 
and boundaries would be placed on both ends of the credit market for credit providers 
and debtors. Today it is important that there is a balance struck between access to credit 
and credit risks which are in fact  interlinked.158 For instance, higher costs of credit 
likely leads to a higher risk appetite on the part of credit providers, which in turn would 
result in increased reckless credit providing, higher default rates, and over-
indebtedness.159 On the other hand, lower costs of credit could deter credit providers 
from providing small loans to the low-income segment of the population, which could 
create a demand for informal or unregulated credit which could in turn also create 
exploited and debt-stressed individuals. The objectives of the NCA aim is to strike this 
balance and it seems that the legislature at the time was aware of the context in which 
these objectives were to operate. The question, however, is whether the NCA’s 
objectives are actually met when the regulations on microcredit are applied in practice. 
Therefore, the construction and potential amendments to the microcredit legislative 
framework need to continuously refer to the above context in which microcredit was 
introduced in South Africa and continues to operate. Only then will the NCA’s 
objectives be truly met.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NCA 
 
          The NCA Regulations on Microcredit 
 
On 6 May 2016, new limits on the cost of credit became effective with the amendment 
of specific provisions in the NCA under the National Credit Regulations.160 These 
amendments focused on changing the maximum permissible interest rates and fees, 
aiming to reduce the cost of credit for most categories of credit.161 A reduced cost of 
credit did seem to occur for most categories, but there was little to no relief for 
consumers of short-term credit, otherwise known as microlenders, for whom credit 
had become more expensive.162 These maximum credit costs do differ according to 
each subsector of the consumer credit market and are thus considered appropriately 
for each credit transaction category.163 Chapter 5 of the Regulations in the NCA sets 
out the maximum permissible interest rates and other costs of credit, such as service 
fees and the initiation fee, that may be charged on credit agreements.164 More 
specifically, these interest and fee limits are set out in regulations 39 to 48 of the 
National Credit Regulations. In general, though, the cost of credit, interests, charges 
and fees are dealt with in sections 100 to 106 of the NCA. Section 101(1) of the NCA 
provides a closed list of the type of payments that a consumer may be required to make, 
namely the principal debt; an initiation fee; a service fee; interest; credit insurance; 
default administration charges; and collection costs. These payments are together 
referred to as the deferred amount.165  
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The category divisions of credit transactions have raised a number of concerns, 
notably around microcredit regulation. As one concern, Jonathan Campbell has 
highlighted that microloans are categorised as ‘short-term credit transactions’ in the 
NCA, but that these loans are invariably unsecured, and so it may be necessary to 
consider them in the different context of ‘unsecured credit transactions.’166 As 
previously stated, a short-term credit transaction is defined as 'a credit transaction in 
respect of a deferred amount at inception of the agreement not exceeding R8 000, and 
in terms of which the whole amount is repayable within a period not exceeding six 
months.’167 On the other hand, an unsecured credit transaction is defined as 'a credit 
transaction in respect of which the debt is not supported by any pledge or other right 
in property or suretyship or any other form of personal security.’168 There is no limit 
as to the amount of the credit transaction or the repayment period and the hallmark of 
this category is that there is no security for the debt at all.169 Campbell argues that it is 
puzzling why it has been ignored that short-term credit is invariably unsecured,170 and 
that this cross-over has a great impact when interest rates are concerned.171 Any 
unsecured loan that is for less than R8 000 and is repayable over less than six months 
is classified as a short-term loan, yet it is no less unsecured than an 'unsecured credit 
transaction.'172 The difference in interest rates that exists between unsecured credit 
transactions and short-term credit, with short-term credit being more than twice the 
price of unsecured credit transactions, is said to be ‘incomprehensible given that both 
forms of credit are unsecured.’173 
Section 105(1) of the NCA provides that the Minister of Trade and Industry 
may prescribe 'a method for calculating' a maximum rate of interest and the maximum 
fees contemplated in the Act. This means that the Minister of Trade and Industry bears 
the responsibility for prescribing such credit costs, and is required to consider a 
number of factors in the process.174 These factors include:175 ‘access to credit for 
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historically disadvantaged persons, low-income persons and communities, and remote, 
isolated or low-density populations and communities; conditions prevailing in the 
credit market, including the cost of credit and the optimal functioning of the consumer 
credit market; and the social impact on low-income consumers.’176 Although it is not 
an easy task to consider such factors and decide on the appropriate credit costs for each 
category of credit, the absence of regulations has far more detrimental consequences. 
Without regulations, microlenders can, and often do, exploit vulnerable and desperate 
borrowers of credit and significantly contribute to their over-indebtedness.177 In fact, 
by allowing the microlending industry to function without properly regulated credit 
costs, the government effectively makes it possible for the exploitation of the lower-
income segment of the population, which arguably amounts to legislated economic 
abuse.178 This brings into question though whether failed credit market regulation also 
amounts to legislative abuse through negligently, and indirectly, allowing exploitation 
and over-indebtedness to thrive.  
The reference to a ‘failed credit market’ entails sides of an argument from both 
creditors and debtors. On the one hand, debtors argue that costs of credit are too high 
for microloans and that they are inadequately regulated. On the other hand, creditors 
argue that the fees in the regulations relating to microcredit are too stringent and have 
thus been making it increasingly more difficult for suppliers of credit to make ends 
meet.179 Although a low fee structure seems to be good for market access, this is not 
always accurate as there may be less suppliers of credit that are willing to lend to the 
low-income segment of the population. Profit margins for these suppliers of credit are 
in fact being drained by increasing competition from other creditors, compliance 
requirements by the NCA, and the issue of unemployment in South Africa.180 In 2012, 
Micro Finance South Africa (MFSA) identified ten factors which are increasing 
operational expenses for microlenders.181 These are: issues relating to debt 
counselling; protraction of unpaid loan collection; codification of the in duplum rule; 
under-disclosure of living costs; under-disclosure of consumer expenses relating to 
affordability; higher operational risks due to crime; inaccurate credit data on lower 
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income consumers; visible growth in the number of non-compliant operators; and 
value added tax application to loan fees.182 The MFSA thus argues that the maximum 
monthly fees in the NCA Regulations, namely the service fees and initiation fees,  
should be adjusted each year with inflation.183 On the other hand, the low-income 
members of society find it more difficult to keep up with these inflation costs.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that there are actually several other reasons 
that commercial banks do not lend to the low-income segment of the population.184 
Some of these include: ‘default rates being high in the low-income market where 
repossessing homes is also proved to be difficult – this highlights the non-profitable 
market accompanied by a high-risk environment; sporadic income in the informal 
sector creating further hesitations to lend; banks charge relatively high fees and 
provide relatively low returns – this is not attractive to the low-income segment of the 
population where fees on accounts, deposits and transactions have a huge impact on 
financial means; the history of defaults in townships has created strong social norms 
and community action to work together to prevent evictions and repossessions which 
makes lending a lot more costly and possibly dangerous for banks; and banks may 
require homeowners seeking home improvement loans to prove that they are using 
certified artisans – this makes it more costly for the low-income segment of the 
population and thus makes these types of loans less attainable.’185 The spread of 
microlending in South Africa has thus not been as broad as some had originally 
expected.186 
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    Interest Rates 
 
According to s 101(1)(d) of the NCA, the interest rate must be expressed in percentage 
terms as an annual rate; must be calculated in the prescribed manner; and may not 
exceed the applicable maximum prescribed rate in terms of s 105 of the NCA. In terms 
of reg 40, interest may be calculated daily and may be added to the deferred amount 
monthly. As stated above, money loans fall under different categories of credit 
transactions introduced by either the Act or the Regulations, each of which has an 
interest rate limit.187 The maximum permissible interest rate on short-term credit 
transactions is 5 per cent per month on the first loan and 3 per cent per month on 
subsequent loans within a calendar year.188 The maximum interest rate on unsecured 
credit transactions is linked to the South African Reserve Bank Repurchase Rate.189 
With regard to short-term loans (microloans) the interest rate reduction from 5 per cent 
to 3 per cent per month occurs only in the case of second or subsequent loans within 
the same calendar year. With the onset of each new calendar year the slate is wiped 
clean and the next loan will be charged at 5 per cent per month. The ill-advised practice 
of consumers taking out repeated one-month payday loans from the same microlender 
is common, frequently resulting in permanent debt traps from which consumers rarely 
escape.190 Therefore, this reduction in terms of multiple loans assists consumers. 
These kinds of regulations not only assist consumers, but it also helps avoid 
socio-economic hardships for low-income individuals and their respective 
communities.191 A high percentage of personal income is often used to service 
microlending debt, leaving very little of borrowers' personal income to pay for other 
household necessaries.192 Interest rates are therefore particularly important here and 
have an impact on financial inclusion. This is due to the fact that interest rates influence 
borrowing decisions of the consumer, who may or may not be able to afford the rates 
charged.193 High interest rates are said to be associated with low levels of financial 
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inclusion as it increases the cost of borrowing and therefore reduces access to credit 
for those who are deterred by these costs.194 It has been argued that the NCA supports 
financial inclusion by paying attention to the promotion of development credit as well 
as ensuring that interest rates are controlled and regulated.195 There are, however, 
disadvantages of controlled, low interest rates where providers of credit find the return 
on interest less worthy of the risk of maintaining small loans. Due to the fact that 
smaller loans are relatively costly it appears that commercialised banks are not willing 
to enter the MFI market below a certain threshold, which has created a gap in credit 
delivery for smaller loans.196  
 
     Initiation Fees 
 
The initiation fee is broadly defined in s 1 of the NCA as a fee in respect of the costs 
of initiating a credit agreement, but neither the Act nor the Regulations give any further 
indication of exactly what costs the fee is intended to cover.197 Practically though, the 
initiation fee is a once-off payment made by the consumer on conclusion of the credit 
agreement or charged to the consumer.198 It may also not exceed the prescribed amount 
relative to the principal debt.199 Due to the fact that it is not clear what costs the fee is 
intended to cover, there are concerns regarding the reason for the existence of the 
initiation fee.200 Not only is it not clear what the fee is intended to cover, but it is also 
almost impossible for consumers to find the necessary cash up front to pay the 
initiation fee at a time when they are taking out a loan precisely because they are in 
need of finance.201 Many debtors of different income levels are thus unable to afford 
to pay the initiation fee when taking out a loan, particularly in the case of the very poor 
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and those who are borrowing money for consumption purposes.202 However, the Act 
seems to have anticipated this possibility, providing that the initiation fee may be 
capitalised. This is, however, then considered a short-term credit transaction, in which 
case it attracts the appropriate permissible interest.203 Borrowers of credit are thus 
forced to accept that the initiation fee will be capitalised and re-paid, possibly in the 
same number of instalments as the initial loan, subject to the same interest rate as the 
initial loan taken out.204 The end result is that the monthly cost of credit increases to a 
greater extent than anticipated.  
The purpose of the initiation fee, it is argued, is to cover expenditures incurred 
by the credit grantor, rather than to allow the credit grantor to make a profit.205 Should 
this be the case, it is puzzling why the charge is called a ‘fee’ which is often associated 
with compensation for services rendered.206 It is also concerning why the expenditures 
such as credit checks, mortgage bond costs and evaluation costs are not accurately 
charged according to their actual cost, and that an arbitrary fee is used instead.207 If 
one argues that the initiation fee does not cover expenditures only, then it has to be 
compensating the credit provider with some kind of profitable fee.208 However, as 
questioned by Campbell, ‘what justification could there be for such compensation, 
when the lender is already earning interest on the loan and charging a monthly service 
fee?’209 
Furthermore, even though the real intended purpose of the initiation fee is 
unknown, there is still an argument made that there should be an inflation-linked 
increase for the initiation fee.210 This increase is arbitrary and lacking in sound 
reasoning when there is not even justification for the fee in the first place.211 It is 
therefore argued that the price captured in the initiation fee might as well be built into 
the interest rate, which would be more appropriate and provide consumers with a 
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clearer indication of the total cost of credit.212 Although it helps to keep interest rates 
low to make credit look less expensive, if we wish to reduce over-indebtedness then 
we need to accurately reflect the true cost of credit.213 More logically though, if the 
existence of the initiation fee cannot be justified, then it should be removed altogether, 
or at least implemented with reference to the actual expenses incurred.214  
 
    Service Fees 
 
The service fee in matters of credit is defined in the NCA as ‘a fee that may be charged 
periodically by a credit provider in connection with the routine administration cost of 
maintaining a credit agreement.’215 Essentially, it is intended to pay for actual 
expenses or disbursements associated with administering a credit agreement,216 and is 
paid either monthly, annually or on a transaction basis.217  As provided for in the Act, 
the maximum monthly service fee applicable to all categories of credit agreements is 
set by the Minister of Trade and Industry.218 The fee that has been set is a ‘flat rate’ 
fee and does not vary according to the size of the loan, as in the case of the initiation 
fee.219 This is despite the Act's explicit requirement that the service fee prescribed by 
the Minister 'must not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt.’220 
Similar to the initiation fee, the increase of the service fee in the amended 2016 
Regulations from R50 to R60 appears to be arbitrary and unrelated to actual costs, 
aimed only at trying to set the total cost of credit at a desired level.221 Although it is 
generally accepted that this ‘flat rate’ applies because the cost of servicing a loan is 
the same regardless of the amount involved,222 this equal treatment has discriminatory 
effects for microcredit. In this regard, the transaction cost is much higher for small 
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loans than for larger loans, making smaller loans more profitable for creditors and 
more expensive to pay back for debtors.223 The 'flat rate' service fee of R60 per month 
therefore ends up being out of proportion to the initial loan amount in the case of 
smaller credit,224 and the effect of the standardised service fee has been to maintain the 
pricing of small loans at unreasonable levels.225 This result also conflicts with s 101 of 
the Act, which provides that the service fee 'must not exceed the prescribed amount 
relative to the principal debt,' meaning that the amount of the service fee should vary 
relative to the principal debt, and should thus be higher for bigger loans and lower for 
smaller loans.226 
On the other hand, the standardised fee is a result of the Department of Trade 
and Industry's main objective based on the need for a distinct piece of legislation that 
treats all credit transactions and credit providers 'equivalently.'227 This is also 
expressed in one of the purposes of the NCA, namely to ensure 'consistent treatment 
of different credit products and different credit providers.’228 However, when the full 
effect of the standardised service fee is taken into account, it is noteworthy that this 
objective has been achieved at the expense of the 'consistent treatment' of 
consumers.229 In this regard, taking out loans will result in unfair and discriminatory 
treatment against debtors who have taken out very small loans and who are almost 
always from the poorest communities.230 The stated purpose of the standardisation of 
fees in the name of consumer protection and equal treatment is therefore strange.231 
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     Evaluation 
 
In evaluating the total cost of credit for the consumer, it is now clear that one needs to 
carefully consider the combined impact of interest rates, the initiation fee and the 
service fees that are charged.232 Therefore, when the initiation fee and service fee was 
first introduced into South African credit regulation, there was a major increase in the 
cost of credit even though it was argued that interest rates were now being capped.233 
As argued by Campbell, ‘the implications of the reduction in interest rates cannot be 
considered in isolation and demands thorough analysis in the context of the total cost 
of credit.’234 The issue that arises here, however, is that often such service fees and the 
initiation fee can remain hidden with the emphasis placed on interest rates due to the 
fact that consumers are more familiar with interest rates and that these are therefore 
more easily marketed on products.235 The result of this is that the distorting of credit 
costs away from interest and towards fees, with which consumers are not familiar, may 
lead to the misleading of the actual total cost of credit. This results in unexpected high 
costs when borrowing money.236 Ultimately, this inhibits disclosure, one of the 
requirements in the NCA, and aggravates rather than combats over-indebtedness 
which is another main focus that the Act aims to address. Furthermore, in the case of 
small loans, this skewing of credit by decreasing interest relative to the fees, is 
particularly concerning as those that are taking out these small loans are often the 
poorest of the population and are ill-equipped to overcome this masking of the true 
cost of credit.237 In other words, consumers of small credit tend to be from lower-
income communities in which lack of education and numeracy skills is more common, 
thus more likely to be misled by credit costs.238 To address the masking of credit costs, 
the NCA does require that interest 'be expressed in percentage terms as an annual 
rate...’239 However, in the case of short-term credit, this requirement seems to have 
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been ignored.240 Given that the repayment period for short-term credit is a maximum 
of six months, this does seem logical. However, the effect of making interest a monthly 
amount figure further obscures the true interest rate in making it look lower than it 
actually is, compared to the other categories of credit.241 
Furthermore, the general increase in administration costs for credit providers, 
together with the caps that have been placed on interest rates and other costs of credit 
in the NCA, also has a negative effect on the providers of credit. Providers of small 
loans to low-income consumers may find that the small returns on high-risk loans are 
not worthy of handling.242 If this is so, these provisions might force low-income 
consumers to continue to make use of expensive credit in the informal sector due to 
the fact that there are few formal sector providers of short-term credit.243 This would 
clearly not be in line with the intentions of the NCA to make credit accessible. 
Furthermore, this reality is highlighted in MFIs where there is a noticeable absence of 
large formal MFIs that are sustainable in encouraging microfinance.244 This is said to 
be due to the fact that MFI loan officers are highly skilled and thus demand relatively 
high salaries, which is unattainable compared to the small loan sizes and the returns 
received on such.245 It has already been established that the cost of microcredit is 
higher than in commercialised banking and therefore MFIs generally have to charge 
higher rates to cover the applicable costs and still retain enough profit to sustain 
themselves.246 This is due to the inherent nature of microfinance which demands high 
transactional costs to make many small loans other than that required to make one big 
loan.247 Unfortunately though, those that create interest rate ceilings are often 
composed of politicians from government, not financial experts, and therefore do not 
adequately take into account these practical considerations in their calculations.248 This 
is problematic in that if an MFI cannot cover the costs of its general operations, it will 
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either reduce access to loan recipients or go out of business altogether, which leaves 
no access to the low-income segment of the population.249 Therefore, the primary 
reason for allowing microcredit providers to recover the maximum possible interest is 
to facilitate full cost recovery. This is in light of the greater risks involved and the 
exceptional methods that they may use - such as not requiring collateral.250  
Not only are providers of microcredit faced with high risk and operation costs, 
but microcredit providers in South Africa, particularly, face multiple challenges 
resulting from South Africa’s first and third world economies, financial regulatory 
environment and social history. These challenges include the following:251 1. 
Economic Dualism: This speaks to the fact that MFIs in South Africa must pay first-
world salaries to skilled employees while earning revenues from third-world loan 
sizes. 2. Formal Competition: This speaks to the fact that MFIs face significant 
competition from formal credit lenders such as commercial banks who offer a broader 
array of financial services in a greater number of locations. This may attract good 
credit borrowers who are not only serious and educated on credit repayment but may 
also eventually seek larger sums of credit. 3. Informal Competition: This refers to the 
fact that the low-income segment of the population can still access credit through 
informal sources such as stokvels and mashonisas. As discussed in Chapter 2, these 
informal sources of credit are perceived as more trustworthy for a number of reasons. 
4. Higher Loan Sizes: This refers to the fact that with the developing economic market 
in South Africa, more people are demanding higher loan sizes, meaning that MFIs are 
less able to diversify their risk and have higher operating costs. 5. Banking Fees: With 
banking fees, MFIs often have to deposit high volumes of small loan repayments to 
commercial banks which charge a fee, ultimately eroding profitability for these MFIs. 
6. Formal Employment Market: Due to South Africa’s high unemployment rate, many 
borrowers of small loans are unemployed. However, should the opportunity arise, 
many would switch to formal employment and, via integration, would make use of 
commercial banking services. 7. Cost of Regulation: South Africa has a first-world 
regulatory environment which imposes many compliance costs on MFIs that are 
considerably higher than other countries that don’t have formal government agencies. 
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8. Limited Entrepreneurial Training: As previously stated, microcredit borrowers are 
often entrepreneurs due to South Africa’s high unemployment rate. However, it is not 
guaranteed that they have the skills to operate small businesses. If their business fails, 
this impacts their ability to repay the loans taken out. 9. Urbanization and Immigration: 
Foreigners or those from rural based communities lack the long-term relationships and 
associated trust with MFIs, which does not assist with attraction.252   
The balance between credit provider and consumer, advocated in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation, is therefore important when considering the above shortcomings and 
their respective critiques. I believe that both debtors and creditors are struggling with 
the current microcredit regulations in the NCA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
252 Ibid. 
 40 
CHAPTER FOUR 
        
CASE STUDY ON BANGLADESH 
 
        Background  
 
In 1971, Bangladesh emerged in the developing world as an independent nation, 
recovering from a history of war and natural disaster destruction.253 As the country 
began to recover from these conditions, the Bangladeshi people, filled with newfound 
energy and commitment, began to see hope in building a nation.254 However, it soon 
became evident that the Bangladeshi government was failing to meet these 
expectations, which resulted in driving the population to create development 
themselves on a community basis.255 In 1976, with this sense of self-help expanding 
through the nation,  an economics professor at Chittagong University, Muhammad 
Yunus, came up with a research project known as the ‘Jobra experiment.’256 This 
experiment sought to lend small amounts of money (microloans) to poor households 
in nearby villages.257 By doing so, Yunus argued that the poor would be able to escape 
their poverty if they had access to such microloans which involved simple, informal 
income generating activities.258 The research project organised borrowers into small 
peer monitoring groups that met weekly with other groups of borrowers to make loan 
repayments.259 Each week all transactions were closed and cleared by the members 
which ensured that debt did not spiral into something unmanageable.260 The idea was 
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that peer monitoring would rely on Bangladeshi community practices where peer 
pressure and trust was a big aspect of their daily lives.261 Therefore, although loan 
contracts were made in the name of individuals, the delivery and recovery process of 
loans used community groups as an essential tool.262 Although generally there was no 
group-guarantee or joint liability in the legal sense, credit discipline was an important 
condition for a loan which was managed through collective borrower responsibility.263  
After a few years of the research project in operation, demand for credit grew 
rapidly amongst the poor who were now able to access credit while repayment levels 
were also proving to be successful.264 Subsequently, by 1983, Professor Yunus was 
able to attract international funding to establish the Grameen Bank, otherwise known 
as the ‘Bank for the Poor’ or the ‘Rural Bank’ in local language.265 The Grameen Bank 
then became regulated by government through a special government ordinance in 
1984.266 Through this ordinance, it has become the only MFI in Bangladesh to be 
awarded a license to operate as a distinct bank for microfinance while other MFIs act 
as NGOs.267 Furthermore, an important aspect of this project, that had now developed 
into a large bank, was that it has focused primarily on microcredit loans to women.268 
Essentially, the core values of the Grameen Bank are about solidarity lending, group 
hedging and women empowerment which cover all of the loans that the bank has to 
offer.269 The Grameen Bank offers various types of loans with different conditions 
attached. These various types of loans include: ‘a basic loan, which has flexible terms 
regarding duration, timing of the loan, scheduling and size of instalments; a flexi loan 
which is a rescheduled basic loan with special conditionalities; bridge loans which are 
offered for those borrowing beyond the normal loan ceiling if the client has a high 
enough savings balance; and a life insurance loan which pays for the entire outstanding 
debt in case of the client’s death.’270 Several other loan types exist such as housing 
loans, special investment loans, education loans, and loans being offered to vagrants 
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with no interest rate.271 Not only are there different types of loans, but the bank also 
coordinates different types of savings accounts when a client takes out a loan.272 Part 
of the loan goes into a client’s personal account and the other part goes into a special 
savings account where they may only draw from under certain conditions.273 This 
ultimately ensures responsible credit lending. The Grameen Bank, by the end of 1994, 
had served over 2 million borrowers with a loan recovery rate of over 90 per cent, 
being among the most successful credit programmes for the poor that the world has 
ever seen.274 This, in turn, led to Yunus being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2006.275 
Although the Grameen Bank was the success story and central focus of 
microcredit in Bangladesh, other MFIs emerged too.  The primary MFIs in Bangladesh 
are essentially categorised into four groups: MFI-NGOs; specialised institutions; 
commercial banks with microfinance programmes; and administrative divisions.276 
The credit services carried out by these groups can be further categorized into six basic 
groups: General microcredit for small-scale self-employment based activities; 
microenterprise loans; loans for the ultra-poor; agricultural loans; seasonal loans; and 
loans for disaster management.277 The most common microfinancial service rendering 
group are MFI-NGOs which were established from the 1970s onwards. For instance, 
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, known as BRAC, was established in 
Bangladesh in 1972.278  It is now active in 11 countries and was ranked in 2018 by 
NGO Advisor as the number one NGO in the world.279 BRAC’s main objective is to 
promote positive social change through development programmes, social enterprises, 
investments and education.280 Another original NGO named Proshika was established 
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in 1976. However, the  present status of Proshika is unclear due to its registration as 
an NGO having been cancelled.281 In 1978 the Association for Social Advancement 
(ASA) was established as an NGO, although its microfinance operations only began 
in 1991.282 It focuses on group development and training among the rural poor, 
offering savings, credit and insurance facilities.283 ASA has now become the topmost 
MFI in Bangladesh in terms of loan disbursement, outstanding loans and number of 
branches, as well as having the second highest number of clients during 2016 and 
2017.284 In the 1990’s, a wholesale financing institution named ‘Palli Karma-Sahayak 
Foundation’ (PKSF) also emerged.285 This was established by the Bangladeshi 
government and international donors to be an instrument for driving the scope of 
microfinance in Bangladesh.286 PKSF helped digress from the International 
Development Association (IDA) project of the World Bank that provided a large 
amount of aid to smaller MFI-NGOs.287 The PKSF now provides NGOs with technical 
assistance to enhance their institutional structure and management information 
systems, which has helped improve efficiency, expand outreach and reduce 
dependence on grants.288 In the beginning days of the Grameen Bank, it relied heavily 
on grants from international donors to fund its operations.289 However, it now claims 
to be funded entirely from deposits of its members, not having relied on grants since 
1998.290 The sector is broadly financed by ‘savings collected from clients, cumulative 
surplus (profit), concessional loans received from sources such as PKSF, grants 
received from national and international donors, and commercial bank borrowing.’291 
The most important source of funding is client’s savings, while cumulative surplus is 
the second most important source of funds, followed by loans from commercial banks 
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and from PKSF, while the least important source appears to be grants from the donor 
agencies.292  
Furthermore, in 1992, the Credit and Development Forum (CDF) was 
established to provide 7 main services to the Bangladeshi microfinance industry: 
‘building capacity; lobbying, networking and advocating; undertaking research; 
developing and becoming an information hub; identifying and disseminating the 
industry best practices; building resource linkages between the MFIs and the banks 
plus the apex lending agency and facilitating exposure visits for organizations from 
within and outside Bangladesh.’293 CDF also maintains a strong relationship with the 
microfinance sector’s primary stakeholders, regulators, think-tank agencies, apex 
funding agency, banks, and donors.294 The CDF’s goal is promotion and development 
of the microfinance industry, its vision is sustainable poverty reduction through 
developing such microfinance industry, and its mission is to create an efficient 
microfinance industry through striking a balance between outreach and 
sustainability.295  
During this period of the 1990’s, ‘second generation’ innovations also began 
to emerge due to the rapid development of technology, the competitive demand for 
microfinance and a wider range of financial services, as well as a call for more 
flexibility and financial access for the poor.296 This ‘second generation’ demand 
calling for more financial savings services sparked the emergence of SafeSave in 1997 
as an experiment for a savings-led individual microfinance project.297 SafeSave is now 
a project of BRAC and its aim is to offer poor people reliable tools to manage their 
money, and it works in eight low-income areas of Dhaka, the capital of 
Bangladesh.298 SafeSave became a permanent, self-sustaining microfinance institution 
in 2002.299 With this rapid establishment of new microfinance branches throughout 
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Bangladesh, as well as the extension of financial services and intensified 
disbursements, microfinance operations grew at an enormous rate.300 
 
Has Microcredit Worked in Bangladesh? 
 
In comparison to the 1990’s, microcredit now plays a more prominent role than ever 
in Bangladesh with more than 750 registered MFIs and a network of over 17 000 
branches.301 The question, however, is whether this major role is due to the larger 
number of MFIs that exist, or whether it is due to the impact that it has had on social 
development. Studies have shown that microcredit has been successful in improving 
the economic conditions of the members,302 but other macro studies have argued that 
there hasn’t been much of a decline in overall poverty levels.303 However, even if 
microfinance hasn’t conquered poverty as a whole, it has still been successful in 
providing access to financial services.304 Not only is it focused on financial services, 
but microfinance is now also an instrument for initiating employment, facilitating 
savings mobilisation among the poor and smoothing consumption.305 Therefore, 
participation in microcredit programmes in Bangladesh does not necessarily imply 
borrowing, although the majority of individuals do mainly make use of the borrowing 
facilities.306  Poverty reduction as well as access to finance has been argued to be a 
success, however, with one source highlighting statistics that overall poverty had fallen 
to 32 per cent by 2010 from its original figure of 57 per cent in 1991 and that it had an 
average annual reduction rate of 1.25 percentage points.307 It is argued that 10 per cent 
of the total reduction in poverty among the rural population is attributed to 
microfinance.308 Furthermore, by 2012 the Grameen Bank, BRAC and other MFIs had 
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reached over 10 million rural households in Bangladesh.309 What these statistics don’t 
show, on the other hand, is how profit-seeking behaviour of microlenders has 
increased and household borrowing has risen rapidly which does not assist 
development in the long run.310 This is in line with neo-Marxist perspective which 
argues that microfinance can be criticised for focusing on the low-income segment of 
the population’s liquidity instead of the socio-economic structures that underlie 
poverty.311 In this regard, it is argued that ‘the very success of microfinance is based 
on failure to challenge the foundations of class structure.’312 
Whether microcredit as an industry has worked is something that has been 
debatable for many years now. One thing is certain though; the Grameen model of 
microcredit has been successful.313 It is a product which meets client needs, has 
developed relatively low-cost delivery mechanisms, and has generated further 
resources and services that allow it to expand.314 The Grameen Bank also works on a 
peer pressure, group based lending model which ensured that the target market would 
filter itself through peer selection in ensuring that ‘bad’ clients were avoided, as it 
effected not only the bank but those who decided to participate in a group related to 
the bank.315 Repayments are also ensured through intensive borrower supervision by 
field staff; peer group monitoring; compulsory savings; and performance incentives.316 
Group-based lending is therefore an essential factor in many of the ways in which 
microcredit has been a success in Bangladesh, mainly by creating social collateral.317 
Group-based lending is particularly useful in an economic setting where poverty exists 
mainly due to socio-political inequity and where financial intermediation requires 
social intermediation that is less expensive to provide to groups than individuals.318 
However, whether group-based lending will work in other countries requires a proper 
assessment of whether social and political mechanisms can serve as vehicles for credit 
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delivery, if it is cost effective, and what the needs of the poor are.319 Moreover, once 
applied, the actual success of the model depends on the commitment to its application, 
working for both programme officials and borrowers.320 There are many factors that 
relate to the environment in Bangladesh that are comparable to South Africa’s 
environment. For instance, Bangladesh’s high population density means that the cost 
of delivery could be brought down; the basic infrastructure for delivery is available; 
there is a regular supply of university graduates with few employment opportunities; 
and levels of law and order are relatively secure.321 
Of the various employment activities for development, small-scale 
business/trade is the most important and accounts for more than 40 per cent of funds 
disbursed by MFIs.322 This proves that Bangladesh has been committed to the initial 
aim of microcredit being a developmental tool in starting businesses. It has also kept 
a relatively low rate of service charge compared to other countries, which has kept the 
cost of credit down but has still acknowledged the expenses in maintaining microloans 
by lenders.323 A problem that has arisen however, is that of ‘overlapping’ loans. There 
are many MFIs to borrow from in Bangladesh, but this has increased the opportunities 
of borrowers taking out multiple loans from multiple MFIs, which has resulted in over 
indebtedness and a threat to the microlending industry.324 It could be suggested that 
there is a connection between borrower defaults and the overlapping lending from a 
number of MFIs.325 Therefore, although multiple sources of credit appears to be 
beneficial to the accessibility of credit, where borrowers have many opportunities to 
borrow money from multiple MFIs, it is not necessarily beneficial to the borrowers 
welfare.326 It is therefore beneficial that financial institutions such as PKSF have been 
trying to introduce a credit bureau in the microfinance sector to regulate this 
overlapping concern.327 This credit bureau would be different to the Credit Information 
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Bureau (CIB) which provides reports to commercial banks.328 Rather, a microfinance 
credit bureau would be one that holds information on MFIs in a centralised system.329 
According to some politicians, academic writers and the popular press, the 
Grameen Bank’s model of microcredit has been based on three particular 
characteristics which have ultimately led it to success.330 The first of these 
characteristics is the so-called ‘solidarity circle’ which is said to serve as a replacement 
for physical collateral.331 This ‘solidarity circle’ requires borrowers to form groups of 
approximately five people, where only two loans are administered by the Bank to two 
people in the group332 while the other members will need to guarantee repayment of 
these loans. 333It is only after these two borrowers successfully repay the loans, will 
the Bank lend to the other members of the group.334 Therefore, although there is no 
form of physical collateral for the loans, the peer pressure that the circle members 
impose on each other is said to be the collateral.335 The second of these characteristics 
is the Bank’s requirement that borrowers comply with the ‘Sixteen Decisions’336 which 
is where the Bank requires borrowers to memorize and repeat to their loan officers as 
a condition of receiving loans.337 This agenda for social development directs borrowers 
to refrain from socially unhealthy behaviour338 and to act economically as it reminds 
them of the importance of entrepreneurialism, hard work, business judgment and 
discipline.339 The third characteristic is the Bank’s focus on lending to women, whom 
make up about 95 per cent of its borrowers.340 This is based on the general assumption 
that women require social, political and economic empowerment.341 Muhammad 
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Yunus claimed that the Grameen Bank’s focus on women is due to the fact that women 
are better ‘fighters against poverty’ and are ‘more likely to use the money to improve 
their family’s situation rather than for unproductive purposes.’342 It must be borne in 
mind though that Bangladesh has a largely Islamic culture, often bearing specific 
views on gender-roles.343 
To ensure successful repayment, there are a number of signature features that 
exist in the Grameen Bank.344 These include: a progressive increase in loan sizes, 
where initial loans are small and when borrowers successfully repay these loans then 
they become entitled to larger loans;345 intensive staffing, where loan officers are to 
visit clients weekly to collect repayments in public view;346 the Sixteen Decisions 
which intends to encourage personal development and progress out of poverty;347 
insurance schemes that combine linked savings accounts, emergency loans, and life 
insurance to minimalize loan defaults;348 and lastly, reasonable and transparent pricing 
of credit costs.349 Another form of insurance is the Grameen Bank’s policy of always 
negotiating and modifying repayment terms when borrowers find repayment 
difficult.350 The Grameen Bank’s success in also being free of corruption and other 
negative practices is said to be due to the unique characteristic of the Grameen Bank 
which focuses on feeling ‘at one’ with the poor and having a great deal of dedication 
and drive for such.351 In this regard, the Grameen Bank is viewed as a non-profit 
organisation but it does in fact act as a for-profit organisation.352 In other words, 
although the Grameen Bank provides financial services to the vulnerable and focuses 
on development; it is not a charity due to its financial operations being similar to a 
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commercial lender, albeit on a smaller scale.353 Other operations within the Bank, 
however, are highly different to a traditional commercial bank. For instance, with 
regards to the solidarity circle, the Grameen Bank uses this group-based lending 
mechanism to avoid spending money and resources on oversight or screening 
functions. By setting the condition that members of a circle may only get further loans 
if all the members of their circle guarantee repayment, the Grameen Bank uses 
informal peer pressure to its advantage.354 It is hoped that members of a circle will be 
careful as to who they rely on for repayments. Even if this screening mechanism 
doesn’t work and there is a delinquent borrower in the group, the Grameen Bank still 
has four other guarantors from whom to seek repayment.355 This means that the 
screening and compliance costs are transferred to the borrowers themselves.356 
Some have argued that these three characteristics of the Grameen Bank’s 
model in fact encourages the poor to continue to engage in informal behaviour that 
still leaves them outside of the financial market.357 However, I argue that although 
these characteristics tend to appear as informal, they are instead a way of moulding the 
formal sector to suit the needs and circumstances of those that come from the informal 
sector, so that there is an easier sense of integration and comfortability. Informality is 
said to result in quicker, easier and deeper market penetration by new entrants due to 
the attractiveness of a familiar and unintimidating space.358 The line between the 
formal and informal sector also tends to be blurred when one attempts to regulate the 
informal sector. This term in itself could be considered an oxymoron as regulation is 
associated with the formal sector while the informal sector is typically unregulated. I 
recommend a compromise or middle ground, where the principles of the informal 
sector are used but are still governed by regulation. In other words, there is a pocket 
of informality inside the formal loan transaction.359 As stated by Muhammad Yunus, 
‘credit without strict discipline is nothing but charity, and charity in the name of credit 
will destroy the poor, not help them. Thus credit institutions must make sure that loans 
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get paid back in full, and in due time.’360 Moreover, the Rule of Law assumes that the 
formalisation of credit transactions plays a critical role in increasing the efficiency and 
access to markets.361 It is in fact through the loan transaction that the value of a 
physical asset changes from being purely physical value to its utility as collateral.362 
Regulation is therefore very important, particularly to ensure repayment, which can be 
done in many different ways. One of these ways has been that the Bank tracks a 
borrower’s microenterprise by regularly confirming that the borrower has actually 
used their loan funds for the purposes of starting up a small business.363 Officials from 
the MRA observe a group of members in monitoring its compliance with rules 
regarding weekly meetings, administering savings accounts, developing business 
proposals, and even overseeing basic skills like being able to write their own names.364 
With sufficient resources, this is an excellent way of ensuring that loans are used for 
developmental purposes and that they are capable of being repaid. However, further 
studies have revealed that the Bank only requires leaders in the borrowing circle to 
complete and update forms that report on the borrower’s uses of loan funds, which 
often results in misreporting on such forms.365 These forms are said to be rarely 
verified by loan officers through visits or other devices, even though spot checks by 
senior bank officers are part of the Bank’s policy.366  
The Grameen Bank’s success, therefore, has not been dependent on a strict 
Rule of Law model.367 The conditions for a loan and means of enforcing repayment 
are largely extra-legal that suit the unique circumstances in Bangladesh.368 In terms of 
formality, the verbal reciting of the ‘Sixteen Decisions’ is however concerning as one 
questions how enforceable this condition is in court.369 Furthermore, studies have also 
revealed that the solidarity circles are not always as effective as they appear to be. The 
purpose of formalisation is primarily to ensure that consumers are protected, however, 
there have been instances where members of a circle have not been able to make 
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repayment and as such have suffered violence and threats from other members of the 
circle.370 Another critique is that although it seems economically viable for an MFI to 
transfer screening and monitoring costs to the borrower through solidarity circles, it is 
not an ideal move considering that the borrowers are the ones that cannot afford to 
bear these costs the most.371 Borrowers are required to spend time and resources in 
peer group meetings to learn about each other’s businesses and monitor each other’s 
compliance.372 Some argue that this creates inefficiency, but I would rather argue that 
it is beneficial as borrowers consequently learn fundamental business skills. It is also 
fair to expect some form of participation in exchange for accessible and affordable 
credit. It is further argued that by imposing joint liability through its guarantee 
requirement, the solidarity circle hinders borrowers from taking the risks that 
mainstream businesses are able to.373 Again, I would contend this, and argue that this 
is an important factor in protecting microlenders from taking irresponsible risks at 
start-up stages. 
There are therefore many arguments for and against adopting the Grameen 
Bank’s model, particularly when placing it in another country. One of the countries 
that have in fact attempted to do so is the United States of America (USA). However, 
through considering the above critiques and the differing contexts, the USA has 
adjusted certain principles of the model. For instance, instead of using the ‘Sixteen 
Decisions,’ the USA has rather transformed the social development agenda into a 
training plan.374 This training plan offers a range of classes on business development 
and financial management, although it primarily focuses on behavioural or 
psychological development towards market integration.375 Some USA microlenders 
find this training aspect even more important than the actual granting of the loan.376 
However, development thinkers have still recognised the importance of incorporating 
local values and habits to increase the chances of a programme being adopted and 
sustained in new contexts.377 It can be difficult, however, when local values and habits 
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are seen as informal, and therefore cannot be easily ascertained and enforced. This is 
a challenge that countries will have to face if they should regulate through loan 
documentation and they therefore need to define the informality to some extent so that 
courts know how to enforce it.378 At the same time, such regulation will need to remain 
true to indigenous values and goals.379 This entails a clear understanding of the market 
before one can begin to define a path towards integration in any country.380  
 
Microcredit Regulation in Bangladesh 
 
From the emergence of MFIs as far back as the 1970’s, no MFI-NGOs offering 
microfinance in Bangladesh had been regulated or supervised by the central bank, the 
Bangladesh Bank or any regulatory authority, except in the case of the Grameen 
Bank.381 Regulation in this regard essentially refers to ‘a set of enforceable rules that 
aim to restrict or direct economic behaviour of market participants,’382 and one of the 
major arguments for regulation is ‘improving efficiency of the institutions, in addition 
to protecting the interests of the microfinance members and borrowers.’383 Towards 
the end of 1997, the Bangladesh Bank authorised a study to assess the regulatory 
aspects of MFIs and their link with the formal financial sector.384 Completed in 1998, 
the major findings of the study were: the statutory regulations under the existing 
banking and financial system did not cater to the special needs of this sector; MFIs 
needed to be legally recognised through the enactment of law to gain access to formal 
sources of funds and operate under an agreed ‘Code of norms/Conducts’ of special 
licensing arrangements; and that self-regulation may supplement the existing or new 
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government regulation being introduced.385 In light of the above recommendations on 
regulations, the Bangladeshi government formed a committee in 1999 which sought 
to ‘a) recommend an effective credit and savings policy for this sector; b) ensure 
transparency and accountability into their activities and; c) make some 
recommendations regarding a regulatory framework and to propose a body to regulate 
and supervise these institutions.’386 In March 2000, the committee submitted its report, 
making major recommendations based on removing overlapping MFI issues; 
establishing linkages between NGOs and the formal financial sector to solve NGO 
funding; policies for loan classification, interest rates, savings, and investments; 
recovering default loans; proper definitions; uniform accounting standards; limit of 
administrative expenses; prudential guidelines for the microfinance sector; 
formulation of performance standards of NGO-MFIs and; the creation of a separate 
regulatory body.387 Subsequently, a Unit was established named the ‘Microfinance 
Research and Reference Unit’ (MRRU) through a government order on 18 June 2000 
and this unit was supervised by the National Steering Committee made up of members 
from the Ministry of Finance, the Social Welfare Ministry, NGO Affairs Bureau, 
PKSF, Grameen Bank, BRAC, and others.388 The Terms of References (TORs) of the 
Committee were based on formulating policy guidelines to regulate MGO-MFIs, 
prepare monitoring activities for the proper performance of these guidelines, and 
prepare a new regulatory authority for MFIs.389 These TORs were achieved by June 
2003, although the regulatory body could not be established due to time constraints.390 
As a result of this, the Steering Committee prepared a draft law for the setting up of a 
regulatory authority and submitted it to the government.391 The draft law essentially 
spoke of a need for an independent regulatory authority that is responsible for 
providing licences to MFIs and monitoring their activities.392 Bangladesh has thus 
been said to have established a different approach to regulation, through establishing 
a separate entity under a separate Act.393 
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With effect from 27 August 2006, the Microcredit Regulatory Authority Act394 
(MRA Act) was passed on the basis of the above suggestions of the Steering 
Committee.395 Before this Act, the microfinance industry had been quasi-formal and 
MFIs had been registered under various Acts as NGOs.396 The new Act therefore 
ensured that the microfinance industry had been formalised with a linkage to the 
central bank, and that the industry was now being properly regulated and monitored 
under its own specialist legislation.397 The MRA Act divided MFIs into four broad 
categories by the number of borrowers and then set differentiated licensing charges for 
each.398 This was different from the usual approach that most countries take with 
microcredit, where microfinance is regulated by the central bank under existing 
banking laws.399 The most important aspect of this newly enacted law, however, was 
the role of licensing. MFIs were now required to apply for licensing through the 
relevant authority.400 This relevant authority was established under the MRA Act as 
the ‘Microcredit Regulatory Authority’ (MRA) which monitors microfinance 
operations of NGOs in Bangladesh.401 The Authority has the duty to ensure 
transparency and accountability of microcredit activities and has been given the power 
to issue and cancel licences for MFIs through overseeing, supervising and facilitating 
the activities of these MFIs.402 Chapter 4 of the MRA Act sets out that no micro credit 
organisation can be established and run without receiving a certificate from the 
Authority while s 21 of the MRA Act states that the Authority shall make public a list 
of micro credit organisations that have been duly registered. The MRA also has the 
power to prepare detailed rules and conditions related to the operations of microcredit 
and may take punitive measures if an institution does not comply with the rules.403 Put 
more simply, the MRA has three primary functions: ‘to license MFIs, to supervise 
MFIs for compliance with licensing requirements and to enforce sanctions in cases of 
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non-compliance.’404 It is also expected to conduct audits and address customer 
complaints.405 This new regulatory framework was introduced to play a crucial role in 
protecting members’ savings, ensuring the sustainability of lenders, improving the 
efficiency of microcredit markets, and to safeguard the stability of the microfinance 
industry.406  
Section 2 (22) of the MRA Act clearly defines ‘micro credit’ to mean ‘loan 
facilities offered by micro credit organisations certified under this Act for poverty 
alleviation, employment generation and to facilitate a small entrepreneur.’ 
Furthermore, s 9 of the MRA Act sets out the responsibilities and activities of the 
Authority, to (a) issue certificates for running micro credit organisations to alleviate 
poverty of the country’s poor people and their overall welfare, as well as cancellation 
of certificates; (b) preserve, examine and analyse the date on establishment of micro 
credit organisations and their field level supervision; (c) merge of micro credit 
organisations; (d) take necessary steps for auditing the accounts of micro credit 
organisations at the request of the financing agency; (e) send information as sought by 
the financing agency and; (f) administer grants received from any foreign government, 
agency or international organisations with prior permission of the government. In line 
with its responsibilities, s 24(2) of the MRA Act states that micro credit organisations 
shall carry out their services with the objectives of: (a) providing loan supports to low-
income consumers to make them more comfortable and self-reliant; (b) providing 
advice and support to low-income consumers to carry out economic activities; (c) 
accepting deposits from members of the micro credit institutions; (d) opening bank 
accounts for offering micro credit; (e) receiving loans or grants from banks or any 
other sources for developing funds; (f) investing the surplus funds in sectors approved 
by the Authority; (g) receiving a service charge for the credit services at a rate 
determined by the Authority and; (h) rendering other different types of insurance 
services and other social development orientated loan facilities. Section 27 of the MRA 
Act also ensures that there is no conflict of interest with regard to those sitting on the 
Board for the Authority and those being paid as an official or member of a micro credit 
organisation. This is to ensure that there is an impartial, outside body doing checks on 
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the industry. With regard to these checks, the sixth chapter of the MRA Act deals with 
compliance and sets out the offences and punishments for non-compliance with the 
Act or the Authority.  
On 19 December 2010, the ‘Microcredit Regulatory Authority Rules 2010’407 
were brought into force.408 The rules define licensing procedures, conditions for 
licenses, temporary suspension or withdrawal of approval, cancellation of licenses, 
and licensing charges.409 For instance, the MRA Rules 2010 require all licensed MFIs 
to maintain cash liquidity at 15 per cent of total net deposits.410 It also allows MFIs to 
collect voluntary deposits from clients if the organization has a minimum of five years 
of experience in conducting microcredit operations,411 if it is profitable for the last 
three years,412 its accumulated loan recovery rate is at least 95 per cent and current 
loan recovery rate is at least 90 per cent during the last five years,413 it maintains 
liquidity of deposits,414 and the total voluntary deposits do not exceed 25 per cent of 
the total capital of the organization.415 These rules and regulations have a direct 
influence on the efficiency of MFIs and therefore make licensed MFIs more attractive 
to microfinance clients than non-licensed MFIs.416 The MRA Rules 2010 describe in 
more detail the procedure, conditions, cancellation, suspension and withdrawal of 
licenses, as well as the managerial structure of the Board, Council and other 
committees dealing with the Authority in regulating microfinance. The MRA Rules 
2010 also describe the financial conditions and restrictions on microfinance funds and 
services, including the conditions for deposits and maintenance of liquidity. It further 
speaks of maintaining registers, records and audits to ensure accountability and 
transparency,417 and focuses on some new points like insurance, reception of deposit, 
classification of loans and provisioning.418 
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The MRA is also known to coordinate sectoral quarterly meetings with the 
CDF.419 These meetings focus on contemporary sectoral issues which benefit a well-
functioning microcredit industry in Bangladesh.420 On 16 April 2017, the CDF 
organised a sectoral meeting to discuss the launching of a study in assessing the 
economic and social impact of microfinance on the lives of the poor, that would be 
done by an independent, reputed research organisation.421 It was agreed that this two-
year study would, on the one hand, assess the socio-economic effects of MFIs through 
a case-study, and on the other hand, conduct an impact assessment of the linkage 
programme named ‘Barga Chashi Unnayan Prakalpa’ (BCUP) or sharecropper 
development project.422 Furthermore, the CDF has published ‘Microfinance Statistics’ 
which is a valuable source of statistical information that provides the overall data for 
MFIs in Bangladesh.423 From the data gathered in considering the microcredit industry 
and its effects on poverty, the CDF strongly supports the efforts aimed at establishing 
a Credit Bureau for the MFIs which would then work as a central database for 
information on clients, outreaches, geographic coverage and microfinancial 
services.424 In this regard, it is clear that the microfinance industry in Bangladesh is 
closely monitored and continuously improved. The organising of meetings, 
development projects and studies aim at creating policy recommendations. Some of 
these recommendations include: improving skills training and marketing so that the 
poor can use credit to their best advantage; lowering interest rates in comparison to 
realising sufficient returns; and encouraging more competition between MFIs by 
protecting smaller MFIs and reducing a monopolisation of the sector.425 Smaller MFIs 
help accessibility in having greater outreach to remote places, and they are also said to 
be more efficient in handling local clients.426 It has also been discussed that there are 
certain conditions needing to be met should financial institutions be sustainable in 
developmental rural settings.427 For instance, it is argued that the government should 
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not see MFIs as profit mechanisms or interfere with them in any way except to provide 
regulation and supervision.428 Although MFIs should not be seen as profit 
mechanisms, it has, however, been claimed that savings mobilisation is an integral part 
of credit delivery so that programmes learn to depend on markets rather than on donors 
for funding.429 To survive as an industry, profit will always be relevant, and so there 
is therefore a call to avoid a purely profit focus but to ensure sustainability which is 
ultimately dependent on some form of profit.  
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   CHAPTER FIVE  
     
AMENDMENTS AND CLOSING 
 
The growth of microfinance throughout the years, both in South Africa and elsewhere 
around the world, has brought about increasing calls for regulation.430 However, the 
way in which the microfinance industry should be regulated is debatable. The structure 
and governance of MFIs is unique,431 and there are concerns around complying with 
prudential regulations and associated supervision policies that can be costly for 
MFIs.432 As highlighted in this dissertation, the assets of MFIs remain substantially 
less than those of banks and other more formal financial service providers, meaning 
that there are less resources to carry out such compliance measures.433 On the other 
hand, seeing as MFIs deal primarily with the poor and vulnerable sector of the 
population, protecting their deposits is essential, which provides a rationale for 
improved regulation and supervision dealing with compliance measures.434  
 
Twin Peaks  
 
In 2017, a new regulatory framework for South Africa’s financial sector was 
introduced by the Financial Sector Regulation Act.435 This is the so-called ‘Twin 
Peaks’ model which governs credit providers and therefore has relevance in the 
microcredit industry. The ‘Twin Peaks’ model is a financial system regulation that 
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calls for the establishment of two, independent, peak regulatory bodies.436 The one 
body is charged with ensuring safety and soundness in the financial system while the 
other aims to prevent market misconduct and the abuse of consumers in the financial 
sector.437 On the one hand, a bank regulator should address the 'financial soundness of 
institutions - including capital adequacy and large exposure requirements, measures 
relating to systems, controls and provisioning policies, and the vetting of senior 
managers to ensure that they possessed an appropriate level of experience and skill.’438 
This is called ‘prudential regulation.’ On the other hand, a second regulator should be 
charged with ensuring that consumers are treated fairly and honestly by protecting 
them against 'fraud, incompetence, or the abuse of market power.'439 Essentially, it is 
proposed that the two primary goals should be to protect the stability and integrity of 
the financial system (‘systemic protection’) under the one peak, and to ensure that the 
interests of individual depositors, investors, and policy-holders are protected 
(‘consumer protection’) under the other.440 The benefit of this Twin Peak model is that 
it will eliminate regulatory overlap and create regulatory bodies that are open and 
accountable with a clear vision.441 
Historically, South Africa had adopted an ‘institutional’ approach in the 
financial sector where regulation was typified by lack of coordination.442 This 
institutional approach is a model that sees entities either regulated according to the 
sector in which they operate, or according to their legal form.443 However, as South 
Africa saw the growth of the private sector becoming more complex in offering a wide 
variety of financial services; an agency dedicated to market conduct and consumer 
protection became more necessary.444 South Africa therefore introduced this ‘Twin 
Peak’ regulatory model approach through the enactment of the FSRA.445 The preamble 
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to the Act highlights the objectives and structure of the Twin Peak model in South 
Africa: 
[T]o establish a system of financial regulation by establishing the Prudential 
Authority and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, and conferring powers on these 
entities; to preserve and enhance financial stability in the Republic by conferring 
powers on the Reserve Bank; to establish the Financial Stability Oversight Committee; 
to regulate and supervise financial product providers and financial services providers; 
to improve market conduct in order to protect financial customers; to provide for co-
ordination, cooperation, collaboration and consultation among the Reserve Bank, the 
Prudential Authority, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, the National Credit 
Regulator, the Financial Intelligence Centre and other organs of state in relation to 
financial stability and the functions of these entities; to establish the Financial System 
Council of Regulators and the Financial Sector Inter-Ministerial Council; to provide 
for making regulatory instruments, including prudential standards, conduct standards 
and joint standards; to make provision for the licensing of financial institutions; to 
make comprehensive provision for powers to gather information and to conduct 
supervisory onsite inspections and investigations; to make provision in relation to 
significant owners of financial institutions and the supervision of financial 
conglomerates in relation to eligible financial institutions that are part of financial 
conglomerates; to provide for powers to enforce financial sector laws, including by 
the imposition of administrative penalties; to provide for the protection and promotion 
of rights in the financial sector as set out in the Constitution; to establish the Ombud 
Council and confer powers on it in relation to ombud schemes; to provide for coverage 
of financial product and financial service providers by appropriate ombud schemes; 
to establish the Financial Services Tribunal as an independent tribunal and to confer 
on it powers to reconsider decisions by financial sector regulators, the Ombud Council 
and certain market infrastructures; to establish the Financial Sector Information 
Register and make provision for its operation; to provide for information sharing 
arrangements; to create offences; to provide for regulation-making powers of the 
Minister; to amend and repeal certain financial sector laws; to make transitional and 
savings provisions; and to provide for matters connected therewith.446 
It is clear from the preamble that the Act aims to introduce various regulatory 
bodies, councils and schemes as well as aims to ensure their coordination and 
cooperation in supervising and administering financial sector laws. Most importantly, 
however, is that this model entails two ‘peak’ regulators, namely a Prudential 
Authority (PA), which is to ‘supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions,' and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
(FSCA), which is to ‘supervise how financial services firms conduct their business and 
treat customers.'447 The specific objectives of these regulatory bodies are respectively 
                                                 
446 Preamble to the FSRA. 
447 'TWIN PEAKS: Second draft of Financial Sector Regulation Bill and draft Market Conduct Policy 
Framework discussion document published for comment' National Treasury Media Statement (11 
December 2014). 
 63 
found in s 33 of the Act448 and s 57 of the Act.449 Furthermore, in terms of structure, 
the National Treasury has noted that the 'FSCA will be a stand-alone market conduct 
authority, while the PA will be an authority established within the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB).’450 The benefit of integrating prudential regulation with 
monetary policy (the PA within the SARB) is said to be that it results in joint 
knowledge of monetary policy and financial market developments within supervisory 
practice.451 Although the FSCA is a stand-alone market, the PA under the authority of 
the SARB is still obliged to co-operate and collaborate with the FSCA to maintain, 
protect and enhance financial stability.452 In sum, the effectiveness of these regulatory 
bodies depends on a ‘clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between each 
regulator; effective co-ordination between the regulators; transparency and 
accountability on the part of each regulator; effective powers of supervision and 
enforcement; operational independence of each regulator; a sound governance system 
and adequate resources.’453  
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The FSRA generally applies to financial institutions rendering financial 
services454 and provides financial products455 in the South African financial system.456 
For purposes of the Act, ‘financial institution’ means a financial product provider; a 
financial service provider; a market infrastructure; a holding company of a financial 
conglomerate; or a person licensed or required to be licensed in terms of a financial 
sector law.457 It is therefore understood that ‘financial institution’ includes MFIs, and 
so the governance of MFIs falls under this Act. According to s 34(1)(e) of the Act, one 
of the functions of the PA is to support financial inclusion,458 and according to s 
58(1)(e) of the Act, one of the functions of the FSCA is to promote financial 
inclusion.459 This emphasis on the support and promotion of financial inclusion speaks 
to the administering of microcredit, and therefore highlights the importance of the 
Twin Peaks in supporting, promoting and protecting the microfinance sector. 
Furthermore, s 58(5)(a) of the FSRA states that ‘when performing its functions, the 
FSCA must take into account the National Credit Act and regulatory requirements for 
financial institutions that are authorised and regulated under that Act,’ while s 76(1)(a) 
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states that ‘the financial sector regulators and the Reserve Bank must cooperate and 
collaborate when performing their functions in terms of financial sector laws, the 
National Credit Act, and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, and must for this 
purpose generally assist and support each other in pursuing their objectives in terms 
of financial sector laws, the National Credit Act and the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act.’  It is therefore essential that the FSRA and its relevant ‘peaks’ take into account 
the objectives in the NCA, particularly relating to microcredit, and must not only 
consider such but must in fact support the pursuance of achieving such objectives. 
Section 81(1)(f) of the FSRA further states that ‘the Financial System Council of 
Regulators must establish working groups or subcommittees in respect of financial 
inclusion,’ which shows precisely the type of commitment expected to achieving the 
objective of financial inclusion. Section 132 of the FSRA also gives the financial 
sector regulator power to conduct a supervisory onsite inspection at the business 
premises of a supervised entity, and therefore could mirror the strict supervisory 
practice in Bangladesh when it comes to MFIs.  
Although the FSRA Twin Peak model does govern the microcredit industry, it 
could be argued that this is not direct enough. When comparing the regulatory 
framework in Bangladesh, South Africa lacks a separate entity under a separate Act 
that is governed by separate rules, which the Bangladeshi government has established. 
Without this specialised framework, there is a lack of clear objectives, functions, 
compliance measures, procedures and general guidelines when it comes to the 
governing of microcredit. Bangladesh is deeply committed to the governance of the 
microcredit industry and this is shown through its unremitting research studies, 
committees, units, forums and policies that aim to continuously evolve and improve 
the microcredit industry. The Grameen Bank’s stance of being ‘at one’ with the poor 
is evident and it is suggested that South Africa should follow suit if it is to truly mould 
its formal sector to meet the needs of its informal sector. Although the FSRA covers 
the microcredit industry and focuses on financial inclusion under both prudential and 
market conduct headings, a ‘one size fits all’ approach will not accommodate the 
specialised needs of the microcredit industry.  
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The NCA  
 
When specifically looking at amending the microcredit regulations in the South 
African NCA, there are a number of suggestions that can be made. These suggestions 
need to ensure a balance between debtor and creditor interests. In Collet v FirstRand 
Bank Ltd460 Malan J stated that the NCA does not only serve the interests of consumers, 
but requires a careful balancing of the interests of both consumers and credit 
providers.461 In terms of amendments, firstly, the service fee could be set at a 
percentage of the loan amount, subject to both a minimum and maximum amount. 462 
This appears to be a better solution than the current provision in place, considering 
that s 101(1)(c)(iii) of the NCA provides that the service fee prescribed by the Minister 
'must not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt.’463 The total cost 
of small loans is too high when considering that the smaller the loan, the higher the 
initiation and service fees are, relative to the loan. 464 Secondly, due to the fact that 
there is no statement in the NCA relating to what the ‘initiation fee’ is intended to 
cover, it is suggested that it should in fact be removed if its purpose cannot be 
justified.465 The initiation fee is particularly onerous considering that it needs to be 
paid by the very people who are without financial resources in the first place and that 
the fee ends up being capitalized with interest, thus obscuring the actual cost of credit. 
This is a common trend in the regulations, where there is a skewing of credit from 
interest to fees. Rather, therefore, fees should be built into the interest rate so that there 
is a clear cost of credit. Thirdly, microcredit should be properly classified as either 
‘short term credit’ or ‘unsecured credit’ due to the abovementioned issues in Chapter 
3 surrounding the differing interest rates applicable to each category.  
With the Draft National Credit Amendment Bill under consideration, it is also 
in the interests of suppliers of credit to be more cautious in their lending habits and to 
follow more stringent regulations. The Bill seeks to amend the NCA to include a 
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section called ‘debt intervention’ which allows a debtor, once in their life, to make an 
application to have their debt written off.466 The maximum amount of  debt allowed is 
R50 000 and it is only for unsecured debts, thus often relating to microcredit 
transactions.467 This is particularly concerning as MFIs could lose large amounts of 
money if numerous debtors are successful with this application. Furthermore, recent 
case law has been trending towards stronger accessibility for poor consumers wanting 
to take out small credit loans. In Truworths Limited and Others v The Minister of Trade 
and Industry and Others468 Engers J highlighted that s 82(1) of the NCA has been 
amended to say that loans ‘must not be inconsistent with the affordability assessment 
regulations made by the Minister,’ in which  one of these regulations, regulation 
23A(4)(c), sets out that ‘a credit provider must take practicable steps to validate gross 
income, in relation to… (c) consumers that are self-employed, informally employed 
or employed in a way through which they do not receive a payslip or proof of income 
as contemplated in (a) or (b) above by requiring: (i) latest three (3) months bank 
statements; or (ii) latest financial statements.’ Engers, J continued to assess the 
purposes of the NCA469 and the protections on reckless credit.470 When assessing such, 
regulation 23A(4) was under attack for being discriminatory and unreasonable.471 
Engers J argued that ‘the attack based on discrimination and unreasonableness centres 
on the fact that category (c) consists largely of the poorer and less privileged members 
of society’ and that the regulation is  ‘in many cases, impossible for them to comply 
with.’472 He proceeded further to state that the attack was well-founded and used as an 
example, a flower seller in Adderley Street who does not have a bank account.473 It 
was argued that this would be an obstacle to obtain credit in a small amount and that 
‘one thinks of a parent who needs to buy a school uniform for his or her child in 
January, and would easily be able to pay the price over the next few months, but who 
cannot afford the entire amount in one go.’474 These remarks could suggest that courts 
are leaning more towards accessibility rather than responsibility when it comes to 
microcredit, which pushes the mandate for a more robust, detailed and comprehensive 
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microcredit regulatory framework. As discussed under the ‘Twin Peaks’ section 
above, perhaps the appropriate place for this would be within a separate Act, operating 
separate entities. However, in absence of such, it is essential that the NCA, at the very 
least, addresses these issues set out above for a more clearly addressed microcredit 
regulatory framework.  
 
          The Personalised Approach 
 
It is highlighted in the abovementioned arguments, around the FSRA and NCA, that a 
more ‘personalised approach’ for microcredit is required in South Africa. Generally, 
when assessing how regulation should be carried out, the most important principle is 
that regulation is tailored to the needs of the microfinance industry in that specific 
country.475  Any single set of regulatory considerations for microfinance will either be 
wrong or vague to the point of meaninglessness.476 Governments should thus consider 
the unique microfinance environment that exists in their country, while also 
maintaining specific norms applicable to microfinance regulation to ensure 
sustainability and growth.477 The idea here is to allow diversity that is compatible with 
the diverse needs of the market, while still ensuring a focused regulatory structure for 
efficiency.478 The regulatory framework should thus be flexible as well as 
controlled.479 In this regard, there are specific principles that apply across the board to 
MFIs, no matter their differing contexts. Some of these include that MFIs should be 
integrated with the formal financial sector;480 that governments should engage in 
consultative processes; that supervisors should have a deep understanding of 
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microfinance; 481 and that there should be a high-level of political support for the 
microfinance industry.482  
Political support for the microfinance industry is primarily shown in the 
regulations and policies adopted by government. Some countries show more support 
than others. For example, Kenya has enacted comprehensive microfinance regulation 
through the Microfinance Act;483 the government of Rwanda has adopted a National 
Microfinance Strategy;484 and, of course, specialised microfinance regulation has been 
adopted in Bangladesh as discussed in the previous chapter. Bangladesh particularly 
stands out as one of the first countries to establish an independent regulatory institution 
with the sole purpose of supervising the microfinance sector.485 The country’s MRA 
Act reflects a sound legal framework for microfinance.486 Not only does it establish a 
separate entity (the Microcredit Regulatory Authority) but Microcredit Regulatory 
Authority Rules have also arisen as a result of this specialised legislation. The MRA, 
as highlighted in Chapter 4, also conducts sectoral quarterly meetings with the CDF 
and encourages the establishment of study units, projects and committees for the 
continuous re-evaluation of microcredit in Bangladesh. Ultimately, it can be argued 
that the success of a microcredit industry depends on the commitment to its 
application, and that Bangladesh is a good example of a committed and passionate 
approach to a successful legal framework on microcredit. 
 
     The Social Collateral Approach 
 
It is noteworthy that even though the above examples lend towards a successful 
microfinance regulatory framework, such is never fixed as regulations should be 
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continuously evolving.487 In adopting innovations, regulators should, as far as 
possible, take into consideration the lived experiences of those whom the regulation is 
effecting.488 Powerlessness does tend to accompany poverty, and so ironically those 
people most at risk of harm from the interventions don’t have much voice in their 
establishment.489 To create a space for these voices, the enforcement of regulation 
should rely, as much as possible, on those that it seeks to regulate.490 Not only should 
they have a voice in the way that the policy is administered, but they should be 
included in the actual enforcement of the policies, such as through peer supervision. 
This is also financially logical as regulation of smaller institutions require more 
resources while their smaller size and community focus makes private peer supervision 
by members more effective.491 Chapter 4 has laid out an example of group-based 
lending in Bangladesh and how it can be useful in an economic setting where poverty 
exists due to socio-political inequity. Similar socio-economic and political 
circumstances exist in South Africa, and there is a possibility that group-based lending, 
as was conducted in Bangladesh, could work in South Africa. Social intermediation is 
not only less costly in a country that lacks the resources to administer and oversee 
multiple microloans at a low cost, but it also acknowledges the cultural context from 
which many microlenders come from while maintaining a blanket of formality. South 
Africa’s social climate makes it eligible for group-based lending, due to peer pressure 
and trust being of great value, and its lack of resources make it a necessity. The 
challenge of implementing principles from the Bangladeshi system, however, arises 
where major resources are still required to ensure weekly group-closings and to ensure 
that loans are being administered for the original intended purposes such as starting up 
small-scale businesses.  
Although peer monitoring can be effective, the regulatory framework should 
also, however, provide a supervisory agency with enough authority to perform its 
mandate so that there is a central body to be accountable to.492 For example, in 
Bangladesh, the CDF not only promotes and controls the microfinance industry but it 
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focuses on developing the industry as challenges may arise. Where officials are used 
in compliance checks, weekly meetings can be monitored through filling in 
compliance forms and doing occasional spot-checks to ensure that microcredit is being 
used for its intended purposes and that repayments are being made. Bangladesh’s focus 
on ensuring that the initial aim of being a developmental tool for starting businesses 
has indeed contributed to its success. Moreover, there should be social performance 
assessments undertaken to understand the industry better and achieve desired 
outcomes when evolving the regulatory framework.493 For instance, as highlighted in 
this dissertation, additional financial services, such as long-term savings and insurance 
products, are important to provide vulnerable members of society with protection 
when they are considering taking out micro loans.494 The Grameen Bank is a good 
example of the way in which an MFI can offer specialized loans, accounts, security 
and other alternative financial services to its clients. The Grameen Bank is not the only 
example though, as Bangladesh has multiple MFI-NGOs with various microfinance 
programmes that focus on training, savings, investing and creating relationship 
networks. 
The Grameen Bank’s three success characteristics must be borne in mind: 
solidarity circles, reciting the ‘Sixteen Decisions’ and the focus on lending to women 
and business starters. However, just like the regulatory framework, a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach will not work. As mentioned with regards to the USA system, an adjustment 
can always be made from the Bangladeshi experience, such as changing the ‘Sixteen 
Decisions’ into a social development training programme instead. Smart thinking, 
coordination and management can go a long way, such as creating savings pockets as 
collateral, using peer group monitoring to manage and disburse loans, gaining grants 
from international donors seeking to assist development initiatives, and providing 
performance incentives.  
 
 
                                                 
493 Skowronski op cit note 103 at 8. 
494 Ibid. 
 72 
Conclusion  
 
To be in debt carries a deep sense of shame and secrecy, often leading to consumers 
feeling alienated and hopeless. In South Africa, debt may arise through various 
avenues, but an important source of debt comes from microloans that have spiralled 
out of control. It is therefore important that our legislative framework governing 
microcredit does not mirror the stigma of shame and secrecy. Instead, the microcredit 
regulatory framework must be confident, clear and direct. This dissertation has 
discussed the microcredit regulatory framework in South Africa, mainly relating to the 
NCA. First, the objectives in the NCA were evaluated, which highlighted the need for 
accessible and responsible credit. By using a positivist interpretation of these 
objectives, they present as clear and straightforward, but when contextually evaluating 
these objectives, it is clear that microcredit has a much higher burden when it comes 
to ensuring that credit is accessible in a responsible way. The specific shortfalls on 
microcredit regulation in the NCA were also highlighted, and it was shown that many 
of these regulations are not confident, clear nor direct. Furthermore, when evaluating 
South Africa’s broader financial sector regulatory framework, the so-called ‘Twin 
Peaks,’ it is of concern that references to financial inclusion and the objectives of the 
NCA force one to broadly apply this to the governance of microcredit. The FSRA sets 
out a body for prudential regulation as well as market conduct regulation, but nowhere 
in this Act is there a specific reference to the governance of the microcredit sector, 
even though it is clear that it does fall under the Act as a financial service. However, 
it must be borne in mind that the FSRA is intended to be a framework Act. Therefore 
more detailed, subordinate Acts are needed, such as the new Insurance Act.495 
This approach in South Africa, where microcredit falls in and amongst the 
general financial sector, does not foster a successful microcredit industry. Microcredit, 
when administered properly, is indeed an anti-poverty mechanism and development 
initiative that has the potential to assist in starting up businesses and to provide 
emergency relief for the most vulnerable segments of our population. In this 
dissertation I have thus set out the Bangladeshi experience on the successful regulation 
                                                 
495 Act 18 of 2017. 
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of microcredit, and have compared the approach taken in South Africa. In Bangladesh, 
there is a specialised Act that maintains a specialised body, governed by specialised 
rules. This shows genuine commitment to the microcredit industry and is depicted in 
the various MFIs offering various micro-financial services. Although this specialised 
approach may initially raise concerns for the availability of resources, South Africa 
can learn from the Bangladeshi experience in using group-based lending to both 
monitor and administer microcredit to consumers. Just as peer pressure may drive the 
demand for material assets and ultimately result in debt-traps, so too is peer pressure 
powerful when being used to administer credit and monitor repayment. In Bangladesh, 
the socio-political climate has been optimal for the use of group-based lending where 
supervisory costs are transferred to the consumers themselves due to the fact that 
community and trust is of such value. In South Africa, community and trust is equally 
valued, and can be shown as a good influence in the use of informal sources of credit, 
such as mashonisas. On the other hand, no case study can be one hundred per cent 
accurately transplanted into another setting due to the fact that the contexts are never 
entirely the same. In this regard, I have argued in this dissertation that if one is to 
demand a proper regulatory framework for microcredit, the context is absolutely 
essential. In South Africa, as well as in Bangladesh, balancing cultural values with 
formalities is fundamental for accurate regulation that acknowledges the socio-
political circumstances of consumers while also ensuring consumer protection. 
Therefore, this does not mean that culture is ignored but rather it is protected to ensure 
that exploitation is avoided and that microcredit lives on to be the success that it has 
the potential to be.  
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